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INTRODUCTION
Justice Louis Brandeis famously characterized the states as labora1
tories of democracy. The most appealing reason for courts to enforce
limits on Congress and to preserve the role of autonomous states is
the prediction that states will in fact experiment with new policies,
looking for new ways to serve the public good, putting new ideas into
†
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1
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments . . . .”).
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practice, and producing evidence about the effectiveness and workability of new programs, to be followed, improved upon, or avoided by
the rest of the states, who can look upon one state’s experiment and
learn. There are times for the national government to stand back and
let policies emerge at a lower level of decision making, and times for it
to deprive local government of the option to be different. Is it better
to deprive local government of the option to be different from the
start, if a patchwork approach to policymaking will plainly do more
2
harm than no regulation at all? Even where disuniform regulation is
tolerable, it may be better to substitute national uniformity at some
later point when the best approach to policy has become so clear that
the states that maintain their own approach to a matter no longer appear to be making a positive contribution to any process of experimentation or to be serving distinctive local conditions and preferences. At that point, the states have begun to appear as laggards, no
longer serving any beneficial purpose by maintaining their differences, but only depriving their citizens of the greater good.
In the experimentation model of federalism, we might classify
states as the vanguard and the laggards. Attempts to sort the states
into these two categories will (and should) produce great disputes
over where the vanguard is and who the laggards are. For example,
3
what do we think of Harvey Milk High School? In this Article, I will

2

This concept is reflected in the dormant commerce clause and foreign affairs
doctrines. See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968) (holding an Oregon
statute, creating conditions for property inheritance by foreign heirs, unconstitutional
as “an intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress” (citation omitted)); Bibb v. Navajo Freight
Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 527-29 (1959) (discussing a situation in which a local highway
safety measure, although nondiscriminatory, placed an unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce by interfering with the need for national uniformity in such regulations); see also Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 1999),
aff’d sub nom. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (addressing
Massachusetts’ “Burma Law,” which bars state agencies from buying goods or services
from companies doing business with Burma, in light of exclusive federal foreign commerce power and foreign affairs power).
3
One newspaper, covering a recent plan to establish a separate high school in
New York City for gay teens, quoted the leader of a gay-rights youth advocacy group
who favors the school as stating, “It’s misleading to say this is an issue of segregation . . . . Kids have fled their home schools to get to us. They need a safe haven . . . . For [one student], suicide was not a mental health issue . . . [h]e was being
harassed at his school” and headlined that “clergy” were the real opposition. Cynthia
Needham & Luis Perez, Gay School Divide Grows; City Council Backs Harvey Milk as Clergy
Threaten Suit, NEWSDAY, Aug. 1, 2003, at A42. Another newspaper, with a nod to “good
intentions,” editorialized against the school: “The city should never suggest that the
solution to problems of discrimination and persecution of students who are perceived
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maintain that it is worth engaging in these disputes, for they form the
foundation of opinions and doctrines about federalism. I also will
hold out the possibility that laggards are, at least some of the time,
part of good federalism. The entire vanguard/laggard distinction
creates a somewhat false, or at least sometimes false, picture of progress, depicting one right answer waiting for us in the future with the
only task being to discover it and put the answer into action—policy
science, as depicted by Brandeis. There is also an important argument for placing tradition, and not innovation, at the center of analy4
sis, either as a good in itself or in the interest of preserving the cultural diversity from which new forms emerge. Maybe the laggard
should be called the traditionalist and valued—at least some of the
time.
With these reservations in mind, let us explore the vanguard and
the laggards and the corresponding role of Congress. States operating autonomously may—as Brandeis would have it—generate evidence that can be used by other government entities in shaping their
own policies. But states operating autonomously may also be producing evidence that can be characterized as violating constitutional
rights. Violations of constitutional rights lay the groundwork for federal statutes depriving the states of autonomy. The Court has inter5
preted Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to allow Congress to
remedy violations of constitutional rights by regulating a “broader
6
7
swath” of behavior than the Section 1 rights alone would reach. To
tap this power, Congress must act upon evidence that there is in fact a
8
“widespread pattern” of constitutional rights violations and respond

as different is to segregate them from the rest of the population. . . . [H]istory has
taught us the best way to fight discrimination is to dismantle it where it occurs.” Editorial, The Harvey Milk High School, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2003, § 4, at 10.
4
This is a position strongly associated with Justice Scalia. See infra text accompanying notes 121-34 (discussing Justice Scalia’s tradition-based analysis in United States v.
Virginia).
5
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
6
See id. § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”).
7
See, e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1977 (2003) (stating
that Congress may enact “prophylactic legislation that proscribes facially constitutional
conduct, in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct”).
8
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 531 (1997) (noting the absence of evidence documenting "some widespread pattern of religious discrimination in this country"); see also infra text accompanying notes 193-266 (describing the Court’s later applications of the “widespread pattern” doctrine).
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9

with a “congruent and proportional” remedy. Thus, there are two
ways of looking at the autonomous activities of the states: we might
see them in a positive light, as Brandeisian experimenters, deserving
to be left alone to contribute new ideas about what good policy is; or
we might instead see them in a negative light, as rights violators,
deserving to be intruded upon and controlled by federal legislation.
To what extent can and does Section 5 doctrine define a role for
Congress that enables it to control the laggard states while preserving
the benefits the vanguard states have to offer? This Article will
attempt to answer that question.
Part I of this Article examines the concept of the states as laboratories. It considers Justice Brandeis’s dissenting opinion in New State
10
Ice v. Liebmann and the various purposes for which the venerable passage has been mobilized. Brandeis’s opinion and its diverse applications over the years have, as we shall see, generated a useful collection
of judicial ideas about federalism. This Part pays close attention to
the two most recent uses of the Brandeis quote, both from Justice
11
Stevens, in United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative and
12
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale. Finally, this Part focuses on United States
13
v. Virginia, a case that not only includes an invocation of the New
State Ice dissent but also provides a key advancement of the Court’s sex
discrimination jurisprudence.
Part II of this Article shows the development of the Court’s Sec14
tion 5 doctrine, beginning with City of Boerne v. Flores in 1997, and
15
becoming especially important after Seminole Tribe v. Florida, which
held that Congress could not use its Article I powers to abrogate state
9

Id. at 519-20; see also infra text accompanying notes 193-266 (describing the
Court’s later applications of the “congruent and proportional” doctrine).
10
285 U.S. 262 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
11
532 U.S. 483, 486 (2001) (finding that federal statutory law preempts state
authorization of the medical use of marijuana).
12
530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (enforcing a First Amendment limitation on a state
ban on discrimination based on sexual orientation).
13
518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996) (finding that the Equal Protection Clause precluded
the state from maintaining a “unique” educational institution for males). This case
proves especially important with respect to the Court’s most recent Section 5 case, Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003), upon which Part III
of the Article focuses in depth.
14
521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (holding the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000), unconstitutional because it exceeded
the enforcement powers of Congress).
15
517 U.S. 44, 45 (1996) (“The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power
under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.”).
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sovereign immunity. This Part then looks at the key cases—Florida
16
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,
17
18
United States v. Morrison, Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, and Board
19
of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett —that applied the
City of Boerne doctrine and created the impression that it had become
20
quite difficult for Congress to tap the Section 5 power. This Part
contemplates whether these cases reflect judicial ideas about the states
as valuable policy experimenters, likely to generate good solutions to
real problems, in the Brandeisian vanguard, then fields a few questions from critics of these cases and notes the extent to which the critics perceive the states as laggards, deserving federal statutory solutions
to the problems they generate.
Part III of this Article focuses on the newest Section 5 case, Nevada
21
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, which dispelled the impression that the Court was fiercely restricting the scope of the Section 5
22
power. Hibbs dealt with the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
23
(FMLA), which guarantees most employees, including state employees, an annual leave of up to twelve weeks to attend to the serious
health needs of family members. Before Congress enacted the FMLA,
16

527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999) (finding a lack of congressional authority to abrogate
state sovereign immunity for patent infringement claims).
17
529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (holding that Congress did not have the power to enact a section of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000),
under either the Commerce Clause or Section 5).
18
528 U.S. 62, 66-67 (2000) (holding that the Section 5 abrogation of state sovereign immunity intended by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2000), exceeded Congress’s Section 5 authority).
19
531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that sections 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 (2000) of
the Americans with Disabilities Act were not an appropriate exercise of Congress’s Section 5 powers).
20
See, e.g., William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54
STAN. L. REV. 87, 89 (2001) (noting that, “[i]n applying legislative record review,
Garrett and its recent antecedents constitute a significant break with Supreme Court
jurisprudence stretching back half a century and beyond”); Ruth Colker & James J.
Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 131 (2001) (expressing the suspicion
that “no amount of factfinding by Congress” will satisfy the Court’s Section 5 analysis);
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 477 (2000) (criticizing the limitations on congressional power imposed by Morrison and Kimel).
21
123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003).
22
For commentary anticipating that Hibbs would reject Section 5 as a basis for
congressional power, see Christopher P. Banks, The Constitutional Politics of Interpreting
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 425, 463-65 (2003); Robert C.
Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1947-49 (2003).
23
29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654; 5 U.S.C. §§ 6381–6387 (2000).
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states were performing experiments with family leave. Were they in
the vanguard, beneficially left alone? Are we sure we know where the
vanguard is with respect to family leave? We may feel quite confident
that ending discrimination against women in the workplace is the only
acceptable direction for state experimentation, but what about the details? If a state accommodates new mothers with generous maternity
leaves, is it experimenting with a new idea that might work well to enable woman to compete in the workplace or is it reinforcing a traditional stereotype? To the dissenting Justice Kennedy, the states had
been in the vanguard, but to Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, the states were contributing to the problem of sex discrimination. Was the uniform standard of a twelve-week leave an inappropriate denial of room to the states to experiment with various approaches to balancing work and family or was it needed to thwart
subtle discrimination in the workplace? This Article explores these
questions in depth, concluding that, despite the majority’s attempt to
explain Hibbs entirely in terms of the heightened scrutiny given sex
classifications, the case really has deviated from the approach taken in
the earlier cases in the City of Boerne line. The Article considers the
extent to which ideas about vanguard and laggard states account for
the different approach.
I. INVOKING AND EXTENDING THE IMAGE OF BRANDEIS’S LABORATORIES
A. What Did Brandeis Really Say in His New State Ice Dissent?
Consider the statement Justice Brandeis made about state experimentation in his dissenting opinion in New State Ice. Referring to the
problems of the Great Depression, he wrote:
Some people assert that our present plight is due, in part, to the limitations set by courts upon experimentation in the fields of social and economic science; and to the discouragement to which proposals for betterment there have been subjected otherwise. There must be power in
the States and the Nation to remould, through experimentation, our
economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic needs. I cannot believe that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment, or the States which ratified it, intended to deprive us of the

24

See Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1989 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he States appear to
have been ahead of Congress in providing gender-neutral family leave benefits. Thirty
States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had adopted some form of familycare leave in the years preceding the [FMLA]’s adoption.”).
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power to correct the evils of technological unemployment and excess
productive capacity which have attended progress in the useful arts.
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country. This Court has the power to prevent an experiment. We may
strike down the statute which embodies it on the ground that, in our
opinion, the measure is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. We have
power to do this, because the due process clause has been held by the
Court applicable to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of
procedure. But in the exercise of this high power, we must be ever on
our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles. If we would
25
guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold.

Justice Brandeis does not appear to view “experimentation” as a
metaphor. His government policymakers operate “in the fields of social
26
and economic science.” Justice Brandeis sought to unleash not only
the state government scientists, but also the federal ones. He favored
experimentation not only in matters of commerce, but also “in things
27
social and economic.” He cautioned courts to resist interfering with
the process of experimentation: Judges have a “grave responsibility”
28
when they exercise the power they have “to prevent an experiment.”
That Justice Brandeis urges both restraint and boldness should
not be seen as an inconsistency. For Brandeis, boldness comes in the
form of trusting government experimenters with their “novel” ideas
and refraining from serving mere “prejudices”—as opposed to true
“principles”—which the “high power” of review judges have designed
for themselves. Substantive due process rights were a powerful tool,
capable of “stay[ing] experimentation,” but according to Brandeis,
because of the benefits that might come from innovative policymakers, especially in dire times, the courts needed to be careful not to fall
into the lazy practice of seeing their own preconceptions as fundamental liberties. He repeats the idea of bravery: Judges should be
bold enough to allow the “single courageous State” to design new

25

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The italicized sentence is the portion
of this passage that is usually quoted.
26
Id. at 311 (emphasis added).
27
Id. Note that Brandeis repeated the phrase “social and economic” four times in
the passage. Id. at 310-11.
28
Id.
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29

programs and policies. Judicial bravery manifests itself as the restraint that permits activism on the part of the brave policy scientists.
There is “risk,” for sure, but at least in a system of federalism, where
the bold experiment comes from the state, the risk is confined to one
30
state. Of course, Brandeis saw the national government as conducting experiments that ought to inspire judicial restraint as well, but
readers are left to make their own inferences about how much restraint Brandeis expected from judges when the experiment is not
confined to one state.
B. Adventures in New State Ice Rhetoric
The Supreme Court Justices have cited the New State Ice dissent
many times over the years. It has been mobilized not only to justify
interpreting constitutional rights narrowly and permitting a state law
to stand, as in the original case, but also to justify avoiding the creation of new rights. The theory is that the state democratic processes
might operate upon the same field and produce similar solutions,
policies that function as better-crafted versions of the rights the courts
might otherwise have designed. For example, in a concurring opin31
ion in Washington v. Glucksberg, Justice O’Connor referred to New
State Ice as she rejected the idea of a due process right to physicianassisted suicide: that the states were in fact “undertaking extensive
32
and serious evaluation” in this area inspired her to refrain from attempting to clutter experimentation with a judicially designed solu33
tion.

29

Id. at 311. Although most of the passage discusses the states as experimenters,
Brandeis refers to the need for “power in the States and the Nation to remould, through
experimentation.” Id. (emphasis added). The interest in minimizing the limitations
of substantive due process rights is in play with respect to policymaking at all levels of
government, though Brandeis understandably concentrates on the states because the
case deals with state law.
30
Id.
31
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
32
Id. at 737 (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292
(1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311).
33
Development has continued at the state level, with one state, Oregon, having
adopted physician-assisted suicide by statute and a number of states experimenting
with alternatives like strengthening hospice care, guaranteeing rights to pain treatment, and educating the public and medical students about end-of-life care. See Stephen Kiernan, Debate on Assisted Suicide Comes to Vermont, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, July
1, 2002, at 6A (describing the current political debate about whether to legalize physician-assisted suicide in Vermont between proponents, such as The Hemlock Society
and Death with Dignity, and opponents, such as the Roman Catholic Church and a
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The New State Ice dissent has been used by the Supreme Court to
justify self-restraint to make room for other courts to play a role in the
34
process of articulating constitutional law. In Johnson v. Louisiana, Justice Powell, concurring in an opinion that accepted nonunanimous
jury verdicts in state criminal cases, acknowledged that “the Civil War
Amendments altered substantially the balance of federalism,” but rejected the notion that “they were intended to deprive the States of all
35
freedom to experiment with variations in jury-trial procedure.” Noting the importance of “empirical study . . . as a foundation for decisionmaking,” he invoked New State Ice:
One of the more obvious merits of our federal system is the opportunity
it affords each State, if its people so choose, to become a “laboratory”
and to experiment with a range of trial and procedural alternatives. Although the need for the innovations that grow out of diversity has always
been great, imagination unimpeded by unwarranted demands for national uniformity is of special importance at a time when serious doubt
exists as to the adequacy of our criminal justice system. The same diversity of local legislative responsiveness that marked the development of
economic and social reforms in this country, if not barred by an unduly
restrictive application of the Due Process Clause, might well lead to valuable innovations with respect to determining—fairly and more expedi36
tiously—the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Doubt about the criminal justice system could have been provided
as a reason to expand the requirements of constitutional law, but Justice Powell uses doubt as a reason to keep the experimentation going,
in order to generate evidence about what the best answer is. Powell
thought the Court should refrain from “drawing [the] difficult lines”
physician-led group that advocates improved palliative treatment). Oregon’s experiment, the 1994 Oregon Death with Dignity Act (commonly referred to as “Oregon
Act”), OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-.897 (2001), led to a power struggle with the federal
government when Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a directive stating that assisting suicide is not a “legitimate medical purpose” for a schedule II drug under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904 (2000). Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F.
Supp. 2d 1077, 1078 (D. Or. 2002). Judge Robert E. Jones granted summary judgment
for the state and chided the Attorney General for trying “to stifle an ongoing ‘earnest
and profound debate’ in the various states concerning physician-assisted suicide.” Id.
at 1079 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735). Relying on a narrow interpretation of
the CSA, the district court judge avoided the question of whether a federalism-based
argument could have succeeded in the face of a clearly preemptive federal statute. See
id. at 1081 n.6 (noting two recent failed attempts to pass such statutes).
34
406 U.S. 356 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
35
Id. at 376.
36
Id. (footnote omitted). In his concurrence, Justice Powell noted that Brandeis
“detail[ed] the stultifying potential of the substantive due process doctrine.” Id. at 376
n.16.
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needed to define constitutional rights and for now approve of one
state’s approach to nonunanimous verdicts. Later, in “a different context” and with the aid of information produced through state experimentation, the Court would be in a better position to “find[] the required balance” needed to perform the difficult task of defining the
37
scope of constitutional due process.
38
Similarly, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, Chief Justice
Burger, joined by then-Justice Rehnquist, wrote about the importance
of empowering state courts to experiment with ways to protect young
victim-witnesses in rape trials. The Chief Justice criticized the majority
for requiring empirical proof that the state’s mandatory closure rule
would lead to increased reporting of sex crimes. Citing the New State
Ice dissent, he wrote: “It makes no sense to criticize the Commonwealth for its failure to offer empirical data in support of its rule; only
by allowing state experimentation may such empirical evidence be
39
produced.”
Justice Marshall has raised an important criticism of this kind of
40
deference. He criticized his fellow Justices who, even at the behest of
a rights claimant facing a death sentence, embraced the notion that
the “Court should postpone consideration of the issue until more
state supreme courts and federal circuits have experimented with sub41
stantive and procedural solutions to the problem.” He commented
on the expansion of Brandeis’s concept:
When Justice Brandeis originally analogized the States to laboratories
in need of freedom to experiment, he was dissenting from a decision by
the Court applying a now-discredited interpretation of the Due Process
Clause to strike down an Oklahoma statute regulating the sale and distribution of ice. As Justice Brandeis recognized, an overly protective view
of substantive due process unnecessarily stifles public welfare legislation
at the state level. Since then, however, the power of the States-aslaboratories metaphor has propelled Justice Brandeis’ concept far beyond the sphere of social and economic regulation. Now we find the
metaphor employed to justify this Court’s abstention from reaching an

37

Id. at 377. Cf. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (expounding a theory of judicial restraint and detailing the
many judicial devices for avoiding questions of constitutional law).
38
457 U.S. 596, 612 (1982) (Burger, J., dissenting).
39
Id. at 617 (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
40
Gillard v. Mississippi, 464 U.S. 867 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (citations omitted).
41
Id. at 869.
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important issue involving the rights of individual defendants under the
42
Federal Constitution.

New State Ice has also been offered as a justification for striking
down federal statutes to preserve room for the free play of state policies. The oldest invocation of Brandeis’s laboratories concept to argue against federal legislative power instead of the scope of individual
constitutional rights appears in Justice Jackson’s dissent in Federal
43
Power Commission v. East Ohio Gas Co., a case in which the majority determined that Congress had authorized the Federal Power Commission to regulate the accounting method used by an intrastate gas
44
company. Adopting a narrower reading of the statute, Justice Jackson dissented. He attributed Brandeisian notions about experimentation to Congress:
Congress may well have believed that diversity of experimentation in
the field of regulation has values which centralization and uniformity destroy. As Mr. Justice Brandeis said, “It is one of the happy incidents of
the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” Long before the Federal
Government could be stirred to regulate utilities, courageous states took
the initiative and almost the whole body of utility practice has resulted
from their experiences.
....
. . . If now and then some state does not regulate its utilities according to the federal standard, it may be a small price to pay for preserving
the state initiative which gave us utilities regulation far in advance of
45
federal initiative.

Justice Jackson’s deference to the states paid respect to their role
in the vanguard of utilities regulation. Contributing to that deference
is a sense that there may be no right answers, at least in some areas,
such as the accounting methods at issue in that case: “We must not
forget that regulatory measures are temporary expedients, not eternal
46
verities—if indeed they are verities at all.” Preserving state autonomy
in such areas, according to Jackson, could help the vanguard continue
to advance:

42

Id. (footnote omitted).
338 U.S. 464 (1950).
44
Id. at 476 ( Jackson, J., dissenting).
45
Id. at 488-89 (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
46
Id. at 489.
43
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Certainly one of the matters on which the states might well be indulged—the right to an opinion of their own—is as to the accounting
methods of a utility whose whole property and business being accounted
for is within the state. Out of their diversity of practice and experience
emerge pragmatic tests. What the Federal Power Commission seeks to
require of this Ohio gas company, for example, is to revert by accounting methods to emphasis on original cost, a basis which William Jennings
Bryan for an earlier generation of progressives eloquently urged this
Court to reject in the field of railroad rate-making. . . . It must be remembered that closer than any federal agency to those they regulate and
to their customers are the state authorities, whose mechanisms are less
cumbersome and whose principles can much more quickly be adjusted
47
to the changing times.

Note that Jackson’s “indulge[nce]” toward the states is supported
by the fact that the Federal Power Commission had not endorsed what
he considered to be the progressive position and by his faith, inspired
by the states’ history of past progressivism, in their potential to arrive
at good solutions to real problems. Yet, while projecting this prudence and faith onto Congress, Jackson simultaneously forswore judicial activism: “We should not utilize the centralizing powers of the
federal judiciary to destroy diversities between states which Congress
48
has been scrupulous to protect.”
An important recent invocation of New State Ice to support the invalidation of a federal statute appears in Justice Kennedy’s concurring
49
opinion striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 in
50
United States v. Lopez. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O’Connor,
47

Id.
Id.
49
18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (2000).
50
514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). A similar use of New State
Ice appears in EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983), in which the majority during the
reign of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), permitted the 1974 amendment to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621– 634
(2000), to reach state and local government law enforcement officials. The majority in
EEOC opined that the law did not “directly impair” the “structur[ing of] integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.” 460 U.S. at 237 (citations
omitted). Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor,
dissented, asserting that the majority had betrayed “Justice Brandeis’ classic conception
of the states as laboratories.” Id. at 264 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Emphasizing Congress’s institutional limitations and the values of federalism, Chief Justice Burger wrote:
[E]ven if Congress had infinite factfinding means at its disposal, conditions in
various parts of the country are too diverse to be susceptible to a uniformly
applicable solution. Wyoming is a State with large sparsely populated areas,
where law enforcement often requires substantial physical stamina; the same
conditions are not always encountered by law enforcement officers in Rhode
48
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took note of various state and local approaches to eradicating violence
in schools and the uncertainty about how best to solve the problem.
Justice Kennedy wrote:
While it is doubtful that any State, or indeed any reasonable person,
would argue that it is wise policy to allow students to carry guns
on school premises, considerable disagreement exists about how best
to accomplish that goal. In this circumstance, the theory and utility
of our federalism are revealed, for the States may perform their role as
laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the
51
best solution is far from clear.

It has been argued that the existence of a federal law imposing
strict prison terms for the gun possession in schools does not detract
from the states’ ability to experiment with other solutions to the same
52
problem. This is not so: a state or locality that would like to experi53
ment with parental responsibility or with gun-exchange programs is
looking for an alternative to harsh imprisonment. Sweeping youths
into lengthy prison sentences undercuts these experiments despite
the fact that the federal government handles the prosecution and
54
runs the prisons.

Island, which has far less land area, no mountains, and no wilderness. Problems confronting law enforcement officers in Alaska or Maine may be unlike
those encountered in Hawaii and Florida. Barring states from making employment decisions tailored to meet specific local needs undermines the
flexibility that has long allowed industrial states to live under the same flag as
rural states, and small, densely populated states to coexist with large, sparsely
populated ones.
Id.
51

514 U.S. at 581 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
49-50 (1973); New State Ice, 285 U.S. at 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
52
See Robert Jerome Glennon, Federalism as a Regional Issue, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 829,
833 (1996) (arguing that “[p]arallel federal criminal jurisdiction . . . does not prevent
states from enforcing their own criminal provisions”).
53
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581-82 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing various means
of ridding schools of guns).
54
See Ann Althouse, Enforcing Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 38 ARIZ. L.
REV. 793, 818-20 (1996) (arguing that uniformity for its own sake should not be allowed to edge out superior state solutions to national problems); see also Jones v.
United States, 529 U.S. 848, 850 (2000) (interpreting the federal arson statute, 18
U.S.C. § 844(i) (Supp. IV 1994), which applied to “property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce,” so as not to
apply to arson of an owner-occupied residence). In Jones, Justice Stevens, joined by
Justice Thomas, wrote separately to call attention to the large disparity between the
penalty given under the federal statute (35 years) and the maximum sentence for arson under the relevant state statute (10 years) and contended that this disparity “illustrates how a criminal law like this may effectively displace a policy choice made by the
State.” Id. at 859 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Even though both levels
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New State Ice has also been used to withdraw protection of state
autonomy and to empower Congress to impose on the state, as was
seen in the majority opinion in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Tran55
sit Authority. Garcia is the high water mark in the recognition of federal legislative power over the states, so the opinion’s use of Brandeis’s
New State Ice dissent might seem puzzling at first, but here Justice
Blackmun wielded elegant—if not entirely convincing—rhetoric:
The essence of our federal system is that within the realm of authority
left open to them under the Constitution, the States must be equally free
to engage in any activity that their citizens choose for the common weal,
no matter how unorthodox or unnecessary anyone else—including the
judiciary—deems state involvement to be. Any rule of state immunity
that looks to the “traditional,” “integral,” or “necessary” nature of governmental functions inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to
make decisions about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes. “The science of government . . . is the science of experiment,” and
the States cannot serve as laboratories for social and economic experiment, if they must pay an added price when they meet the changing
needs of their citizenry by taking up functions that an earlier day and a
56
different society left in private hands.

That is to say, the good thing about state autonomy is freedom to
innovate. It is the vanguard state that Justice Brandeis wanted to
promote, so he would see National League of Cities v. Usery’s protection
57
of “traditional [state] governmental functions” as exactly backward.
Why it would protect the laggards, the states working the traditional

of government viewed arson as a very serious crime and even though the federal government would handle the prosecution and punishment, the federal law was still portrayed as interfering with state autonomy. Id. Like Justice Jackson in East Ohio Gas Co.,
supra text accompanying notes 43-48, Justice Stevens attributed this vision of federalism to Congress and, like the rest of the Court in Jones, relied on statutory interpretation to carve out a role for the state in addressing problems of national import. Jones,
529 U.S. at 859 (Stevens, J., concurring).
55
469 U.S. at 546.
56
Id. (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 226 (1821), and citing
New State Ice, 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). Justice Powell, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor, took issue with the Garcia majority’s use of New State Ice :
Apparently the Court believes that when “an unelected federal judiciary”
makes decisions as to whether a particular function is one for the Federal or
State Governments, the States no longer may engage in “social and economic
experiment.” The Court does not explain how leaving the States virtually at
the mercy of the Federal Government, without recourse to judicial review, will
enhance their opportunities to experiment and serve as “laboratories.”
469 U.S. at 567 n.13 (citation omitted) (Powell, J., dissenting).
57
426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
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field—Justice Blackmun seems to say —while leaving the vanguard
states open to regulation! He therefore perceives nothing worth protecting at the state level and opts to give a free hand to Congress,
which seems to be the institution undertaking innovation. It is innovation, after all, that inspires judicial boldness, in the Brandeisian
model, so, according to Justice Blackmun, the Court should unleash
Congress rather than make a protected sphere for the states.
C. New State Ice Protects the Vanguard in Oakland Cannabis
and Boy Scouts of America
59

The two most recent citations to the New State Ice dissent have
come from Justice Stevens, who looked with favor at two states that
generated progressive experiments: California, which authorized the
medical use of marijuana, and New Jersey, which banned discrimination based on sexual orientation. In the California case, United States
60
v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, Justice Stevens concurred with
61
the majority that the federal criminal law preempted the state law,
but faulted the majority for ruling out any defense based on “medical

58

Yet, surely a state working in a traditional field such as education might still innovate. Failure to take account of the ability to innovate within traditional areas is one
reason why Blackmun’s rhetoric is not entirely convincing. The most obvious problem
is that the purported concern for state autonomy serves only as leverage to empower
Congress to intrude further on the states.
59
New State Ice is, however, implicitly referred to in Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct.
2325 (2003), which approved the use of affirmative action in student admissions at the
University of Michigan Law School. See infra note 116 (comparing the use of diversity
justification in Grutter with the Court’s treatment of the rationale in a sex discrimination case). The Grutter opinion praises the states as “laboratories of democracy,” citing
Justice Kennedy’s Lopez concurrence, which cited New State Ice. See supra text accompanying notes 49-54 (relating Justice Kennedy’s citation of New State Ice). To find explicit citations to New State Ice predating Boy Scouts of America v. Dale and United States v.
Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, one needs to go back to 1997 to two cases that rejected a right to physician-assisted suicide. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 809 (1997)
(referring to O’Connor’s concurrence in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997),
in which she cites New State Ice); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 737 (citing Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring), citing New
State Ice, 285 U.S. at 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). Justice O’Connor’s role is
notable: she wrote the Grutter opinion, she joined Kennedy’s Lopez concurrence, and
she wrote the Cruzan opinion as well as Glucksburg. O’Connor’s earliest citation to New
State Ice appeared in one of her first opinions, her influential dissent in Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788 (1982).
60
532 U.S. 483 (2001).
61
The Court found that the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971
(2000), preempted California’s Compassionate Use Act of 1996, CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2004).
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62

necessity.” He suggested that, perhaps, a little room for state experimentation could be created by reading the federal statute more
narrowly.
[T]he importance of showing respect for the sovereign States that compose our Federal Union . . . imposes a duty on federal courts, whenever
possible, to avoid or minimize conflict between federal and state law,
particularly in situations in which the citizens of a State have chosen to
“serve as a laboratory” in the trial of “novel social and economic experi63
ments without risk to the rest of the country.”

At least within some confined area that does not threaten other
states, or upon some stronger showing, California could have been
seen as offering to conduct a pilot program that would yield helpful
information about both the benefits and detriments of this form of
64
marijuana use.
65
In the New Jersey case, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, Justice Stevens in his dissent invoked New State Ice as he credited the state for positioning itself in the forefront of moral progress: “New Jersey ‘prides
itself on judging each individual by his or her merits’ and on being
‘in the vanguard in the fight to eradicate the cancer of unlawful dis66
crimination of all types from our society.’” He criticized the majority
for failing to “accord this ‘courageous State’ the respect that is its
67
due.” Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, took Justice
Stevens to task for misusing the venerable quotation: Justice Brandeis
was “a champion of state experimentation in the economic realm,”
not “a champion of state experimentation in the suppression of free

62

Oakland Cannabis, 532 U.S. at 499. The majority, in an opinion written by Justice Thomas, took the position that the federal law represented a conclusive rejection
of any exceptions for medical necessity. Id. Justice Stevens sought to restrict the
Court’s holding to the manufacture and sale of marijuana. Id. at 499-500 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). He chided the majority for expansively rejecting the necessity defense
even with respect to a more compelling case, such as “a seriously ill patient for whom
there is no alternative means of avoiding starvation or extraordinary suffering” and for
“gratuitously cast[ing] doubt” on the defense with respect to all federal criminal statutes. Id. at 501 (Stevens, J., concurring).
63
Id. at 502 (quoting New State Ice, 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
64
The majority, however, saw the state as falling away from the federal norm—the
appropriate uniformity—which in fact makes a good deal of sense considering the difficulty of controlling commerce in marijuana.
65
530 U.S. 640 (2001).
66
Id. at 663 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trs.,
389 A.2d 465, 478 (N.J. 1978)).
67
Id. at 664.
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68

speech.” Referring to Brandeis’s concurring opinion in Whitney v.
69
California, the Chief Justice located the process of searching for the
70
good at the level of individual interaction, not within government.
According to Brandeis, the “freedom to think as you will and to speak
as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of
71
political truth.”
In Whitney, as in New State Ice, Brandeis placed his trust in the human capacity to reason. Unfettered speech—creating a marketplace
of ideas—would allow individuals to reason and discover what is good.
In New State Ice, Brandeis urged judges to “guide by the light of rea72
son” by refraining from seeing mere “prejudices” as rights. In both
settings, Justice Brandeis expressed faith in the capacity of human beings to use their mental powers to reach the best answers. In New State
Ice, he would free government policymakers, while in Whitney, he
would free the individual or the private association. Dale presents a
nice puzzle for thinking about levels of decision making and the advisability of leaving room for innovation. There is nothing about the
dueling Brandeis quotes that tells us how to choose which level of decision making to empower—the government, which concluded that
groups like the Boy Scouts should not discriminate based on sexual
orientation, or the private association, which decided that Scout lead73
ers should present heterosexual role models. It is tempting to say
that New Jersey is in the vanguard and that protecting gay rights is at
the cutting edge of innovation, so courts should stand back and permit that experiment to take place; the Boy Scouts are laggards, stuck
in the past, and not deserving of protection from New Jersey’s limited
experiment. The degree of confidence about where the vanguard is

68

Id. at 660. Note the friction between this rejection of New State Ice when faced
with First Amendment rights and its invocation in Chief Justice Burger’s dissent in
Globe Newspaper, which then-Justice Rehnquist joined. See supra text accompanying
notes 38-39 (discussing Justice Burger’s citation of New State Ice in criticizing the majority in Globe Newspaper for requiring empirical proof in support of the state’s rule to
close rape trials to protect young victim-witnesses).
69
274 U.S. 357 (1927).
70
Dale, 530 U.S. 660-61 (quoting Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
71
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375.
72
New State Ice, 285 U.S. at 311.
73
Cf. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 34-35 (1959) (concluding that there is no principled way to choose between
the right of association and the antidiscrimination right confronted in the school desegregation cases).
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and who the laggards are can powerfully influence a decision maker
74
to expand or contract rights.
Justice Stevens would vigorously empower the vanguard state:
“[E]very state law prohibiting discrimination is designed to replace
prejudice with principle,” so “Justice Brandeis’ comment on the
States’ right to experiment with ‘things social’ is directly applicable to
75
this case.” That muddles Brandeis’s statement. Brandeis wrote that
courts, in wielding their great power to label things rights, need to be
careful that they do not call something a right when all they are seeing
is their own prejudice. Thus, it was wrong, according to Brandeis, to
view the requirement of a license to deliver ice as a violation of a right
76
to be free of such restrictions. In Dale, New Jersey’s law was designed
not to relieve judges of a prejudice about what rights are, but to force
entities like the Boy Scouts to abandon leadership criteria that the
state perceived as prejudice-ridden. If the Court thought that the
right of association permitted the Scouts autonomy to choose only
leaders who express the group’s own values, to say that the Court was
“erect[ing] [its] prejudices into legal principles,” one would need to
say it is mere prejudice to believe the Boy Scouts have a right to make
77
decisions about their leaders’ self-expression. Yet surely, the belief in
expressive association is not prejudice simply because it would protect
78
prejudiced speech!
Undoubtedly, Justice Stevens would back away from the boldness
that comes in the form of judicial restraint at some point, with respect
to some claims of constitutional right. The trick is in saying what the
rights are. Which comes first for these decision makers, the right or
the analysis of when state experimentation is good? In New State Ice,
Justice Brandeis was battling the old substantive due process doctrine
and accused the majority of imagining rights to exist where they be79
lieved government should not act. Put another way, where one sees

74

Justice Scalia offers one solution to this puzzle in his dissenting opinion in
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1998). See supra text accompanying notes 100-34
(discussing the Court’s analysis of sex discrimination in United States v. Virginia).
75
Dale, 530 U.S. at 664 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76
New State Ice, 285 U.S. at 311.
77
Id.
78
See Dale, 530 U.S. at 701 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Whether the group appears to
this Court to be in the vanguard or rearguard of social thinking is irrelevant to the
group’s rights.”).
79
The New State Ice majority countered:
[I]t is plain that unreasonable or arbitrary interference or restrictions cannot
be saved from the condemnation of that Amendment merely by calling them
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experimentation with various policies as a benefit, one ought to “be
bold” and look to puncturing the illusion that a right stands in the way
of what the vanguard state would like to do. But when is the right
only an illusion, only a prejudice that the judge boldly casts aside, and
when is the judge cravenly failing to recognize a right? When should
an individual right stand in the way of something the state would like
to do?
Drawing on Brandeis’s conception, one might suggest that rights
ought to obstruct state policy when the rights themselves operate in
the service of progress—one ought to see rights when they function to
force the laggard state to abandon the old ways that persist only be80
cause of prejudice. But whether this suggestion is appealing will depend (in part) on one’s confidence in the ability of judges to find the
81
vanguard and identify the laggards. What an exquisite paradox occurs when this confidence takes the form of judicial restraint, the
82
proud passivity of not seeing a right!

experimental. It is not necessary to challenge the authority of the states to indulge in experimental legislation; but it would be strange and unwarranted
doctrine to hold that they may do so by enactments which transcend the limitations imposed upon them by the federal Constitution.
285 U.S. at 279-80. This is essentially the same argument Chief Justice Rehnquist made
in response to Justice Stevens in Dale.
80
This suggestion would seem to describe the motivation underlying the majority
and concurring opinions in Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority, finding that the state’s law banning same-sex sodomy violated
substantive due process, faulted Texas for its laggard position on the road of progress.
Justifying adapting the Constitution to modern times, he characterized the Court as
“search[ing] for greater freedom” and acquiring greater insight into which “laws once
thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.” Id. at 2484. Similarly, Justice O’Connor, writing in concurrence and finding a violation of equal protection,
faulted the state for its law expressing “mere moral disapproval of an excluded group.”
Id. at 2488 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
81
This suggestion will also be unappealing to anyone who objects to the normative
form of structural analysis. There is always the alternative of attempting to restrict
oneself to textual, historical, and doctrinal analysis. Nevertheless, I believe that normative, structural concerns will continue to play a role in the analysis. See Ann Althouse, Why Talking About “States’ Rights” Cannot Avoid the Need for Normative Federalism
Analysis: A Response to Professors Baker and Young , 51 DUKE L.J. 363, 364 (2001) (concluding “that there is no escape from the normative question” in analyzing federalism). For this reason, I am deliberately writing in terms that I believe describe real decision-making processes, even though I realize some readers will prefer a more austere
formality, at least with respect to the written work of judges.
82
See supra text accompanying notes 40-42 (noting Justice Marshall’s criticism of
the Court for undervaluing rights in order to permit the states to continue to experiment).
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D. Sex Discrimination and New State Ice: The VMI Case
Let us begin to focus on the issue of sex discrimination, the basis
for the Section 5 power the Court found for the FMLA in Hibbs. Hibbs,
which Part III discusses in depth, does not directly discuss New State
Ice, but as we shall see, it raises many of the New State Ice concerns.
The most recent sex discrimination case to discuss New State Ice di83
rectly is United States v. Virginia (commonly referred to as the VMI
case), which used the right to equal protection to deprive the state of
its ability to maintain a single-sex military academy, the Virginia Military Institute (VMI). Because the VMI case is also the key sex dis84
crimination case relied on in Hibbs, it deserves special attention here.
Virginia wanted to preserve (or should we say continue experimenting with?) a type of education that it deemed suitable only for
males. It sought to produce “‘citizen-soldiers’” by using “‘an adversative, or doubting, model of education,’” defined by “‘physical rigor,
mental stress, absolute equality of treatment, absence of privacy, min85
ute regulation of behavior, and indoctrination in desirable values.’”
Using the heightened scrutiny applicable to sex classifications, the majority, in an opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, found that Virginia’s
male-only policy was not “substantially related” to an “important state
86
policy.” Ginsburg emphasized that, because Virginia had failed to
show that admitting a woman would necessarily destroy the “adversa87
tive” system, its policy rested only on generalizations about women’s
83

518 U.S. 515 (1996).
The Court’s commentary on the nature of sex discrimination may be especially
useful in that it was written in the same year that the FMLA was enacted.
85
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 522 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407,
1421 (W.D. Va. 1991)).
86
Id. at 557-58; see also id. (“There is no reason to believe that the admission of
women . . . would destroy the Institute rather than enhance its capacity to serve the
‘more perfect Union.’”).
87
See id. at 540-43 (“The notion that admission of women would . . . destroy the
adversative system . . . is a judgment hardly proved . . . .”). Here, Virginia had argued
that the distinctive adversative method would have to be changed if any women were
admitted, thus depriving men of a “unique” benefit without offering a new benefit to
women, who could already attend a public, coeducational school in Virginia. Id. at
535-36. But even if most women would not voluntarily undergo this method of education, as the Court assumed, that assumption was a stereotype, insufficient to justify excluding individuals merely because they belonged to a group for which the stereotype
was generally true. Moreover, it was a stereotype—that women prefer nurturing, supportive treatment—that, the Court showed, had been wielded frequently over time to
exclude women from all sorts of endeavors. Id. at 543-45. Unlike the majority, Justice
Scalia, in dissent, agreed with the district court’s conclusion “that if Virginia were
to include women in VMI, the school ‘would eventually find it necessary to drop the
84
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88

capacities and preferences. In the view of the majority, that left Virginia with no valid argument against admitting an individual woman
who chose to undertake the adversative form of training and was capable of enduring it.
The heightened scrutiny test applied in the VMI case traced back
89
to Craig v. Boren, which rejected a state’s differential drinking ages
for males and females. In Craig, the Court deprived the states of the
option to use gender as a proxy for “‘archaic and overbroad’ generali90
zations.” That is, states relying on sex classifications were essentially
making two mistakes. First, they were stuck in the past, thinking about
gender in a way that had not kept up with societal changes and using
“increasingly outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females
91
in the home rather than in the ‘marketplace and world of ideas.’”
Second, they were treating a person as a member of a group rather
than as an individual. Even if it were true that most men or most
women had particular characteristics, it would still be wrong to assume
that any given individual had these characteristics.
These are two distinct problems: one calls upon the state to readjust its generalizations to keep up with changes in the real world. This
problem requires fact-finding, and since conditions vary geographically, it may be worthwhile to allow the states to operate with at least
some autonomy. In some states, perhaps large proportions of women
have moved out of the traditional role, while, in other states, traditional roles may have remained deeply entrenched. There is, inevitably, some interweaving between what women in a particular place
have actually done and what the culture of a particular place values. It
is one thing to say that a state should be permitted to make an assumption about what women do or what women prefer because, in
that state, though not in others, the assumption is quite accurate as a
generality. It is another thing to say that a state should be able to
make a particular assumption about women because, in that state,
though not in others, that is what people tend to believe women
should do. So actual practices and embedded values vary from place

adversative system altogether.’” Id. at 578 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Virginia, 766
F. Supp. at 1413).
88
See id. at 541 (indicating that Virginia’s expert witnesses asserted views regarding
“’typically female tendencies’” (quoting Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1434)).
89
429 U.S. 190 (1976).
90
Id. at 198 (quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975)).
91
Id. at 198-99 (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975) (alteration in
Craig)).
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to place, and the first concern expressed in Craig, that gender not be
used as a proxy for “archaic . . . generalizations,” is susceptible to state92
by-state variation. Importantly, the variation in majority values is a
93
distinct facet of this problem.
The second concern expressed in Craig is a universal principle:
94
do not treat an individual as a member of a group. Even if all but
one woman would abhor VMI’s “adversative training” and even if
nearly everyone in Virginia believed that women belonged in the
bosom of the family, excluding that one woman would still violate the
principle that human beings deserve to be treated as individuals and
not as members of groups. Yet in the end, Craig does not go so far as
to demand that sort of individual treatment without regard to sex: it
accepted, as an alternative to gender-neutrality, “identifying those instances where the sex-centered generalization actually comported with
95
fact.” That is, the problem was not simply in generalizing, but rather
in inaccurate, prejudice-ridden generalizing.
It is notable that Justice Rehnquist dissented in Craig, for he
would, nearly thirty years later, write the majority opinion in Hibbs re96
lying heavily on the heightened scrutiny announced in Craig. In his
Craig dissent, he accused the majority of pulling the standard “out of
97
thin air” and particularly objected to using heightened scrutiny to
strike down a state law that disadvantaged only young men, given the
complete absence of evidence that they have suffered any historical
98
discrimination or needed any “special solicitude from the courts.”
Moreover, according to Rehnquist, the proposed heightened scrutiny
formula assigned courts the work of deciding which government objectives are “important,” the one task most sensibly left to democratic
99
decision making.
92

Id. at 198.
See infra text accompanying notes 121-34 (discussing Justice Scalia’s opinion favoring state autonomy to preserve the traditional values of the majority).
94
See 429 U.S. at 208-09 (noting that “the principles embodied in the Equal Protection Clause are not to be rendered inapplicable [for individuals] by . . . loose-fitting
generalities concerning . . . aggregate groups”).
95
Id. at 199.
96
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1982 (2003).
97
Craig, 429 U.S. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
98
Id. at 219.
99
Id. at 219-21. Note Justice Rehnquist’s discussion of the evidence needed to justify legislation:
The Court’s criticism of the statistics relied on by the District Court conveys
the impression that a legislature in enacting a new law is to be subjected to the
judicial equivalent of a doctoral examination in statistics. Legislatures are not
93
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It should have been easy to say that the production of “citizensoldiers” was an “important state interest” and the “adversative training” in a single-sex environment is “substantially related” to that interest. But applying the heightened scrutiny test in the VMI case, the
Court now relied on the universal concern that had only been dictum
100
in Craig: do not treat an individual as a member of a group. Over
the protests of Justice Scalia, who, in dissent, pointed out that the
Court had never before held “that a sex-based classification is invalid
101
unless it relates to characteristics that hold true in every instance,”
the majority held that “overbroad generalizations about the different
talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females” would not
102
suffice. It was true enough that few women would opt for “adversative training,” but the state could not make the necessary “exceedingly
103
persuasive justification” for a male-only school by using a generality.

held to any rules of evidence such as those which may govern courts or other
administrative bodies, and are entitled to draw factual conclusions on the basis of the determination of probable cause which an arrest by a police officer
normally represents. In this situation, they could reasonably infer that the incidence of drunk driving is a good deal higher than the incidence of arrest.
And while, as the Court observes, relying on a report to a Presidential
Commission which it cites in a footnote, such statistics may be distorted as a
result of stereotyping, the legislature is not required to prove before a court
that its statistics are perfect. In any event, if stereotypes are as pervasive as the
Court suggests, they may in turn influence the conduct of the men and
women in question, and cause the young men to conform to the wild and
reckless image which is their stereotype.
Id. at 224.
100
See supra note 94 (providing support for this concern in Craig).
101
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 573-74 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 81 (1981), which upheld male-only selective-service registration even “assuming that a small number of women could be drafted for noncombat roles, [because] Congress simply did not consider it worth the added burdens of
including women in draft and registration plans”).
102
Id. at 533.
103
Id. at 531. In a concurrence, Chief Justice Rehnquist complained about the use
of the phrase “exceedingly persuasive justification,” which he worried might heighten
or at least “introduce[] an element of uncertainty” to the intermediate scrutiny test.
Id. at 559 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Notably, his opinion in Hibbs avoided this
phrase. 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1976-84 (2003). Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opinion in the
VMI case, observed the majority’s apparent preference for the phrase, as evinced by
nine uses of it. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 571-73. Justice Scalia asserted that the majority has
changed the formula because
[o]nly the amorphous ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ phrase, and not
the standard elaboration of intermediate scrutiny, can be made to yield this
conclusion that VMI’s single-sex composition is unconstitutional because
there exist several women (or, one would have to conclude under the Court’s
reasoning, a single woman) willing and able to undertake VMI’s program.
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One might speculate that the majority wielded its intermediate
scrutiny test with extra vigor because it had confidence that only a
laggard state would cling to same-sex education today. But in fact
there was good reason to think that progress could lie in that direction. Justice Ginsburg took account of arguments by proponents of
all-female schools, who “urged that diversity in educational opportunities is an altogether appropriate governmental pursuit and that single104
sex schools can contribute importantly to such diversity.” Indeed, it
is the mission of some single-sex schools “‘to dissipate, rather than
105
perpetuate, traditional gender classifications.’”
The majority opinion struggled to preserve the ability to use sex discrimination in the
vanguard, while still finding a way to force the rearguard Virginia institution to open itself to women:
“Inherent differences” between men and women, we have come to
appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the
members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s opportunity. Sex classifications may be used to compensate women “for
particular economic disabilities [they have] suffered,” to “promot[e]
equal employment opportunity,” to advance full development of the talent and capacities of our Nation’s people. But such classifications may
not be used, as they once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, social,
106
and economic inferiority of women.

Finally, the Court resolved the case on the narrow ground that
Virginia offered no all-female school comparable to the extraordinary
VMI, which had developed over a long period of time into a unique
107
institution.
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion is thus a prime example of

Id. at 573. The Chief Justice, however, was able to use the “standard elaboration of intermediate scrutiny” in Hibbs to arrive at the same kind of analysis, which saw a violation of the Equal Protection Clause when states make sex classifications based on
stereotypes, even when the stereotype is factually supported as a generality. Infra text
accompanying notes 338-39.
104
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 n.7.
105
Id. (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae Twenty-six Private Women’s Colleges at 5,
Virginia (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107)). Note that the cited brief did not support the state
of Virginia; it extolled only private same-sex education and contended that no federal
law barred sex discrimination in the admissions processes of institutions of private
education. Brief of Amici Curiae Twenty-six Private Women’s Colleges at 13-20, Virginia (Nos. 94-1941 94-2107).
106
518 U.S. at 533-34 (citations and footnote omitted).
107
See id. at 539-40 (concluding that “[h]owever liberally [VMI’s] plan serves the
Commonwealth’s sons, it makes no provision whatever for her daughters,” thus violating equal protection). Virginia’s attempt to create a comparable women’s program,
the Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership (VWIL), fell far below the mark. See id. at
556 (reviewing VWIL and holding that “[the] remedy does not match the constitutional
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crafting doctrine to separate the vanguard from the laggard, carefully
framed to leave a basis for distinguishing newly conceived same-sex
schools, especially ones designed to advance women and overcome
108
old stereotypes.
Hinting at the role he would take in Hibbs, Chief Justice Rehnquist
did not dissent. His concurring opinion took something of a middle
109
position, marked by sympathy for Virginia’s predicament. The state
had established VMI in 1839, long before the Fourteenth Amendment
was even adopted and surely quite long before the Court began
to reveal that there was any constitutional problem at all with its
110
It was not until 1982 that the Court had rejected a samepolicy.
111
sex educational institution.
Thus, only at this point, according to
the Chief Justice, was Virginia “on notice” of a possible constitu112
Only evidence after 1982 should
tional violation in its VMI policy.

violation”). It was a special program designed around what the state argued were the
“real” needs of women, but which the majority saw as the same old stereotypes. See id.
at 550 (observing that “generalizations about ‘the way women are,’ estimates of what is
appropriate for most women, no longer justify denying opportunity to women whose talent and capacity place them outside the average description”). Moreover, the alternative program was simply worse than VMI’s program according to many objective standards, such as the qualifications of the admitted students, the quality of the faculty,
and the size of its library. Id. at 551-53.
108
The proposal for a separate high school for gay students raises similar questions. See supra note 3 (describing mixed public reaction to the possibility of segregating gay students to protect them from homophobic attacks). It should be noted, however, that the school in question would not actively exclude students who were not gay.
Needham & Perez, supra note 3, at A42. Since the Supreme Court has not applied
heightened scrutiny to discrimination based on sexual orientation, it ought to be
much easier to defend an all-gay school than an all-female school. Yet, I would speculate that a judge might very well perceive the all-gay high school as an inappropriate
solution for a harassment problem and, viewing the state as a laggard, apply minimal
scrutiny with enough bite to make it less likely to pass muster than an all-female school
designed to advance the interests of women.
109
See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 563 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“No legislative wand
could instantly call into existence a similar institution for women; and it would be a
tremendous loss to scrap VMI’s history and tradition.”).
110
Id. at 560-61.
111
Id. at 561 (citing Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)).
112
Id. In determining when Section 5 power can be used to deprive states of their
sovereign immunity, however, the Court has allowed Congress to rely on actions of the
state as violations of constitutional rights from a period before there was Supreme
Court precedent putting the state on notice that these actions in fact did violate the
Constitution. See infra text accompanying notes 286-89 (discussing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445, 447-48 (1976)). This fits the vanguard/laggard distinction in that a vanguard state anticipates the path the case law will take, while the laggard state may continue in its own ways until it is forced by the courts to change. The state that thereafter
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therefore be used in determining what Virginia’s real reasons were for
113
In the Chief Justice’s view,
maintaining a single-sex policy at VMI.
Virginia did not deserve to have any of its earlier justifications “held
114
against it,” regardless of how stereotypical or prejudiced they were.
The Chief Justice accepted that Virginia could not instantly make
a new institution equal to the century-and-a-half-old VMI, but he
faulted Virginia for failing to make a “genuine effort” after 1982 to
build a truly prestigious all-female institution. If Virginia had only devoted more resources and made a creditable beginning at creating
this new institution, he wrote, “it might well have avoided an equal
115
protection violation.” Virginia argued that the single-sex institution
116
was justified by the governmental interest in “diversity” —offering an
flouts the Supreme Court precedent may be the worst sort of laggard, but the state that
waits for a clear statement from the Court is not the vanguard.
In this light, consider the dispute that took place in the late 1980s about the scope
of habeas corpus review of state court decisions. In Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407
(1990), the majority, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, foreclosed habeas relief when the state court followed all of the clear constitutional precedent. For
the majority, the state court was not operating at a low enough level to deserve the intrusion of federal court review. Id. at 414-16. Justice Brennan, dissenting, was far
more inclined to see the state court as unacceptably lagging behind on the path of
constitutional law interpretation:
As every first-year law student learns, adjudication according to prevailing law
means far more than obeying precedent by perfunctorily applying holdings in
previous cases to virtually identical fact patterns. Rather, such adjudication requires a judge to evaluate both the content of previously enunciated legal
rules and the breadth of their application. A judge must thereby discern
whether the principles applied to specific fact patterns in prior cases fairly extend to govern analogous factual patterns. . . . [A]djudication according to
prevailing law demands that a court exhibit “conceptual faithfulness” to the
principles underlying prior precedents, not just “decisional obedience” to
precise holdings based upon their unique factual patterns. The inability of
lower courts to predict significant reformulations by this Court of the principles underlying prior precedents does not excuse them from the obligation to
draw reasoned conclusions from principles that are well established at the
time of their decisions.
Id. at 423 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. at 266 n.5
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
113
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 562 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“[U]nlike the majority, I
would consider only evidence that postdates our decision in Hogan, and would draw no
negative inference from the Commonwealth’s actions before that time.”).
114
Id.
115
Id. at 563.
116
Id. at 525. It is interesting to compare the Court’s rejection of the “diversity”
justification in the VMI case with its acceptance of “diversity” as a “compelling governmental interest” justifying disadvantaging white law school applicants based on race in
Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003). In the VMI case, the asserted diversity would
occur in the collection of all of the state’s schools through keeping one school less
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alternative to coeducational institutions in the state—but the Chief
Justice would only accept that justification if there were an equivalent
117
That is, he would have preserved
single-sex institution for women.
some space for the state to design its own policies, but faulted Virginia
for falling outside of that permissible space:

diverse (that is, there would be coeducational and a same-sex school, and schools
without the adversative method and one school with it). The school doing the sexbased exclusion was internally more uniform by reason of the exclusion. In Grutter, the
asserted diversity occurred within the school that used racial classifications in its admissions process. I would speculate that the most important distinction between the two
cases is this: In Grutter, the majority either believed the university was experimenting
in the vanguard or had enough doubt about where the vanguard was to make state
autonomy preferable; by contrast, the majority felt confident that VMI was lagging.
Quite interestingly, the Grutter majority cited Justice Kennedy’s concurrence from Lopez, as it characterized the state—a bit warily—as a worthy experimenter:
We see no reason to exempt race-conscious admissions programs from the requirement that all governmental use of race must have a logical end point. . . .
In the context of higher education, the durational requirement can be met
by sunset provisions in race-conscious admissions policies and periodic reviews
to determine whether racial preferences are still necessary to achieve student
body diversity. Universities in California, Florida, and Washington State,
where racial preferences in admissions are prohibited by state law, are currently engaged in experimenting with a wide variety of alternative approaches.
Universities in other States can and should draw on the most promising aspects of these race-neutral alternatives as they develop.
....
We take the Law School at its word that it would “like nothing better than to
find a race-neutral admissions formula” and will terminate its race-conscious
admissions program as soon as practicable.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2346 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring), for the proposition that “the States may perform their role as
laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is
far from clear”). Grutter was thus implicitly invoking the New State Ice dissent upon
which Justice Kennedy’s Lopez opinion relies. See supra text accompanying notes 49-54
(describing Justice Kennedy’s reliance on the New State Ice dissent and the principle of
state experimentation to strike down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(q)(1)(A) (2000), in Lopez).
117
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 564 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice also
disparaged the adversative method, asserting that it did “not serve an important governmental objective” because it was not shown to be “pedagogically beneficial
or . . . any more likely to produce character traits than other methodologies.” Id. The
Chief Justice attributes the belief that the adversative method is not a good enough
governmental interest to the majority opinion as well, though he gives no page citation. Id. It would appear, however, that the majority assumed the interest in the adversative method but rejected the state’s assertion that its preservation depended on
the exclusion of all women. The majority demanded that female applicants be judged
as individuals rather than stereotypes and rejected the idea that all women would require “accommodations” of the sort that would mean the abandonment of the adversative system. See supra text accompanying notes 85-88 (detailing this section of Justice
Ginsburg’s majority opinion).
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Had the Commonwealth provided the kind of support for the private
women’s schools that it provides for VMI, this may have been a very different case. For in so doing, the Commonwealth would have demonstrated that its interest in providing a single-sex education for men was to
some measure matched by an interest in providing the same opportunity
118
for women.

The Chief Justice evinced more concern for autonomous state
policymaking than the majority, but it was Justice Scalia alone who dissented. Like Justice Brandeis, who favored progress through democ119
racy, Scalia fretted about judicial enthusiasm for rights—at least new
rights or rights other than the First Amendment. Justice Scalia wrote:
“The virtue of a democratic system with a First Amendment is that it
readily enables the people, over time, to be persuaded that what they
120
took for granted is not so, and to change their laws accordingly.”
Unlike Brandeis, Justice Scalia put tradition, not progress, at
the center of his analysis. The word “tradition” (or “traditional”) ap121
peared eighteen times in his opinion.
He also paused to write a
118

Virginia, 518 U.S. at 564 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice was
prepared to allow the state considerable flexibility in fashioning an appropriate remedy:
An adequate remedy in my opinion might be a demonstration by Virginia that
its interest in educating men in a single-sex environment is matched by its
interest in educating women in a single-sex institution. To demonstrate
such, the Commonwealth does not need to create two institutions with the
same number of faculty Ph. D.’s, similar SAT scores, or comparable athletic
fields. . . . Nor would it necessarily require that the women’s institution offer
the same curriculum as the men’s; one could be strong in computer science,
the other could be strong in liberal arts. It would be a sufficient remedy, I
think, if the two institutions offered the same quality of education and were of
the same overall caliber.
Id. at 565 (citation omitted).
In Hibbs, the Chief Justice picked up Justice Ginsburg’s theme of avoiding gender
stereotypes, infra text accompanying notes 336-37, but the passage quoted above may
seem to suggest gender stereotypes, as the Chief Justice referred to “computer science”
and “liberal arts.” However, it is probably not an accident that he implicitly reversed
the stereotype, referring to women’s institutions and computer science first in the two
phrases and liberal arts and men’s institutions second.
119
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (describing the ability of states in a federal system to experiment for the social
and economic betterment of the nation).
120
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 567 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
121
Id. at 566-603; see e.g., id. at 566 (eschewing the majority’s lack of respect for
“the long tradition . . . of men’s military colleges supported by both States and the
Federal Government”). Justice Scalia outstripped this record with his dissent in Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2488-98 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting), which had twentyeight uses of the word “tradition” (or variations like “traditionally”). Even Lawrence is
not Scalia’s record. In his plurality opinion in Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604,
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long footnote bemoaning the majority’s minor gaffe in calling the
University of Virginia “the Charlottesville campus,” a failing that to
Scalia revealed the majority’s lack of connection to the grand historical tradition of education in Virginia, a tradition—Scalia pointed
122
The word “old” appears
out—that goes back to Thomas Jefferson.
123
six times in Justice Scalia’s dissent, not counting two references to
“Old Dominion” (mentioned once in listing the names of the many
institutions of higher education run by the state that are not called the
124
University of Virginia and once as a traditional epithet for the state
125
of Virginia). At one point, writing about his style of interpreting the
Constitution, Justice Scalia called the document “the Constitution of
126
the United States—the old one.” He also chided the majority for relying on “various historical anecdotes designed to demonstrate that
Virginia’s support for VMI as currently constituted reminds the Jus127
tices of the ‘bad old days.’” This is a blunt way of saying the majority
cannot respect a state that has not chosen to be in the vanguard. Justice Scalia’s orientation toward tradition is seen most strikingly at the
end of his dissenting opinion in the VMI case. He sets out in full the

607-28 (1990), Scalia uses variations of “tradition” thirty-two times to explain why personal jurisdiction based on service of process in the forum state does not violate due
process. Admittedly, he did not invent the phrase “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice,” and so many of the repetitions of the word in Burnham were inevitable. See, e.g., id. at 609 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945)). Justice Scalia’s Burnham opinion, which was joined in full only by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, makes a wonderful contrast to Justice Brennan’s
opinion in the same case. Brennan’s concurring opinion, which Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and O’Connor joined, did not accept “tradition” as sufficient to establish
due process, despite the oft-quoted International Shoe phrase. Id. at 630 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). Consistent with his expansive view of jurisdiction (that is, his minimal conception of due process), Brennan found jurisdiction based on “contemporary notions of
due process,” id. at 630, which was to Scalia an improper “outright break” from the
“traditional notions” that ought to govern due process analysis. Id. at 623. Burnham
makes a nice example of the tradition/evolution difference in constitutional interpretation in which the evolution position is not about expanding rights, such as those in
the privacy or death penalty cases, but about limiting them. For another example from
the procedural realm, see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 335-37 (1979), illustrating how the Seventh Amendment right to a jury in a civil trial is under pressure
from contemporary ideas about collateral estoppel.
122
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 584-85 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
123
Id. at 566-603.
124
Id. at 584-85 n.4.
125
Id. at 587.
126
Id. at 567.
127
Id. at 586.

1774

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 152: 1745

very old-fashioned “Code of a Gentleman,” which first-year VMI stu128
dents were required to carry. Here, Justice Scalia observed:
In an odd sort of way, it is precisely VMI’s attachment to such oldfashioned concepts as manly “honor” that has made it, and the system
it represents, the target of those who today succeed in abolishing public
single-sex education. . . . I do not know whether the men of VMI lived
by this code; perhaps not. But it is powerfully impressive that a public
institution of higher education still in existence sought to have them do
so. I do not think any of us, women included, will be better off for its
129
destruction.

Justice Scalia cautioned judges not to erect their newly developed
beliefs into rights because the democratic “system is destroyed if the
smug assurances of each age are removed from the democratic proc130
ess and written into the Constitution.” Accordingly, Scalia wanted to
131
recognize only rights that are embedded in historical tradition.
Since “the tradition of having government-funded military schools for
men is as well rooted in the traditions of this country as the tradition
of sending only men into military combat,” change should come
132
through democratic choice.
Finally, Justice Scalia poked a New State Ice-icle at the majority:
[I]t is one of the unhappy incidents of the federal system that a selfrighteous Supreme Court, acting on its Members’ personal view of what
would make a “‘more perfect Union,’” (a criterion only slightly more restrictive than a “more perfect world”), can impose its own favored social
and economic dispositions nationwide. As today’s disposition, and others this single Term, show, this places it beyond the power of a “single
courageous State,” not only to introduce novel dispositions that the
Court frowns upon, but to reintroduce, or indeed even adhere to, disfavored dispositions that are centuries old. The sphere of self-government
133
reserved to the people of the Republic is progressively narrowed.

That is, while Justice Brandeis wanted to protect federalism in the
hope that a vanguard state would prove to the rest of us how some
128

Id. at 602-03. The Code includes instructions such as “[a] Gentleman . . . [d]oes
not lose his temper; nor exhibit anger, fear, hate, embarrassment, ardor or hilarity in
public . . . . Does not put his manners on and off, whether in the club or in a ballroom.
He treats people with courtesy, no matter what their social position may be.” Id.
129
Id. at 601-03.
130
Id. at 567.
131
Id. at 567-70.
132
Id. at 569.
133
Id. at 601 (citing, in order to illustrate the willingness of the current Court to
limit the power of states to employ novel or disfavored policies, Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620 (1996); BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996)).
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problem might be solved, Justice Scalia embraced the laggard state—
adhering to an old form, but respectable democratic self-governance
nonetheless. Both Brandeis and Scalia wanted to relieve the states of
134
Because Justice Scalia is in the
the limitations of too many rights.
dissent as he takes this position, I will continue to use my pejorative
term “laggard” for the state of Virginia, but I want to give him credit
for presenting a counter-vision, which recasts the majority’s laggard
state as the traditional state, valuable in itself.
E. Vanguard Evidence, Laggard Evidence
In the “laboratories of democracy” vision of federalism, the states
are prized for their capacity to generate useful evidence leading to
better solutions to current problems. In the next Part, which deals
with Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, we will see that under
the doctrine that has developed since the mid-1990s, when the Court
decided City of Boerne, the states are also viewed as a source of evidence. Now, however, the evidence will be of constitutional violations, and that evidence—while it will still be used as a basis for designing solutions to problems—will operate to empower Congress to
enact statutes that restrict state actions. That is, the diverse activities
of the state, under Section 5 doctrine, will be characterized as violating constitutional rights and justifying the imposition of limitations on
the states’ future choices. The positive potential of the states to generate new ideas will be overshadowed by the negative potential of the
states to do harm. As we shall see, Section 5 doctrine attempts to

134

For a different view of laggard states and traditional approaches, see Justice
Goldberg’s concurrence in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg,
J., concurring):
My Brother Stewart, while characterizing the Connecticut birth control law
as “an uncommonly silly law,” would nevertheless let it stand on the ground
that it is not for the courts to “‘substitute their social and economic beliefs for
the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.’” Elsewhere, I
have stated that “[w]hile I quite agree with Mr. Justice Brandeis that . . . ‘a . . . State
may . . . serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments,’ I
do not believe that this includes the power to experiment with the fundamental liberties of citizens . . . .” The vice of the dissenters’ views is that it would
permit such experimentation by the States in the area of the fundamental
personal rights of its citizens. I cannot agree that the Constitution grants such
power either to the States or to the Federal Government.
Id. at 496 (citations omitted). In Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Thomas, in his dissent, repeated Justice Stewart’s epithet “silly” to describe a state law banning homosexual sodomy. 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2498 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Like Stewart, he endorsed
state-by-state legislative response and rejected judicial action.
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answer the question: When does the need to control the laggard
states outweigh the promise of benefits that might come from the
vanguard states? Or perhaps it is more accurate to state that Section 5
doctrine honors the vanguard states because it views Congress as having learned from their experiments, identified a good solution, and
built a statutory floor below which the laggard states may no longer
fall. Under this view, the vanguard state remains free to experiment,
but only by moving further in the direction that the Congress has
identified as the right direction.
II. THE ROLE OF THE LAGGARD STATES IN GENERATING POWER
UNDER SECTION 5 TO REPLACE STATE EXPERIMENTATION
WITH A NATIONAL STANDARD
A. Introduction
Even though the Supreme Court has modestly reconfigured its
135
commerce power doctrine in recent years, that power remains
tremendously expansive, permitting Congress to regulate the vast
range of activities in the commercial sphere. The breadth of the
commerce power had long minimized the importance of other
clauses granting power to Congress. Since 1996, however, the power
granted to Congress under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
has gained special importance because of the Court’s decision in
136
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, which held that Congress may not abrogate
state sovereign immunity using the commerce power. Seminole Tribe,
137
which overruled a tenuous decision from the late 1980s, remains

135

See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that the Commerce
Clause does not support a private right of action for gender-motivated violence);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the Commerce Clause does
not support criminalization of gun possession in a school zone); see also Jesse H. Choper, Taming Congress’s Power Under the Commerce Clause: What Does the Near Future Portend?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 731, 735 (2003) (noting that Lopez and Morrison, without more,
have “few practical effects” on congressional power “except at the margin”); Deborah
Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 676 (1995) (noting the “minor restraint on congressional power” imposed by Lopez); Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643, 661 (1996) (emphasizing the minor effect of Lopez);
Ronald D. Rotunda, The Eleventh Amendment, Garrett, and Protection for Civil Rights, 53
ALA. L. REV. 1183, 1218 (2002) (noting that the Court’s recent federalism cases “do
not prevent the federal government from enacting any commercial regulation that
would be necessary for a central government”).
136
517 U.S. 44 (1996).
137
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989). Union Gas was a particularly
weak precedent because the fifth vote that produced it came from Justice White, who
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138

controversial and may perhaps be overruled one day, but for now, it
has had the effect of focusing attention on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Let us then consider the scope of Section 5 in
connection with the abrogation of sovereign immunity, as it has developed in the post-Warren Era, and the extent to which the doctrine
that has evolved in recent years reflects a creditable vision of federalism.
B. Federalism and the Fourteenth Amendment in 1976: Fitzpatrick
139

According to Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, a unanimous decision with a
majority opinion written by then-Justice Rehnquist, Congress has the
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the
states’ traditional defense of sovereign immunity to lawsuits brought

concurred with exasperating coyness: “I agree with the conclusion reached by Justice
Brennan in Part III of his opinion, that Congress has the authority under Article I to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States, although I do not agree
with much of his reasoning.” Id. at 57 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). White was the only Justice voting for this result who also adhered to the traditional interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment propounded in Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U.S. 1 (1890), which found that states have sovereign immunity in federal question
cases. Thus, no one who believed in “the fundamental structural importance” of sovereign immunity explained why the Commerce Clause included the power to abrogate.
Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 44. The other four Justices who approved of Commerce Clause
abrogation in Union Gas were all strongly committed to overruling Hans, a development in constitutional law that would have made power to abrogate entirely unnecessary.
See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 258-302 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). With no explanation for Commerce Clause abrogation from a Justice who
thought the states had any constitutional immunity from suit in cases based on federal
law, Union Gas was highly susceptible to attack when the personnel on the Court
changed. See Ann Althouse, The Alden Trilogy: Still Searching for a Way to Enforce Federalism, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 631, 636-40 (2000) (noting that the Union Gas overruling “is easily
attributed to personnel change on the court”). By the time Seminole Tribe was decided,
the only Justice remaining on the Court who had joined the 1980’s attacks on Hans was
Justice Stevens. Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer all replaced Hans opponents,
and have accepted that precedent, though they oppose Seminole Tribe. Id. at 637. Justice Thomas, who replaced Hans opponent Justice Marshall in 1992, would consistently
vote to preserve the venerable precedent, along with the four Justices—Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Scalia—who had earlier voted with
Justice White in support of Hans. Id. All four of these Justices dissented in Union Gas.
Id. Justice Thomas added a fifth vote for this position, which then drew a majority in
Seminole Tribe. Id.
138
See, e.g., Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1927, 1984 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring) (“I join the
Court’s opinion here without conceding the dissenting positions just cited or the dissenting views expressed in [Seminole Tribe] . . . .”); Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (restating the position that there is no constitutional state immunity and hence no problem
with abrogation by statute).
139
427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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140

by individuals. As Seminole Tribe would later underscore, the Reconstruction Era constitutional amendments represent a very different
historical understanding of the relationship between the national and
141
Acthe state governments from that of the original Constitution.
cording to Fitzpatrick, it is right to read these amendments as including
a power to abrogate state sovereign immunity, because they are properly seen as having “fundamentally altered the balance of state and
federal power,” specifically creating federal power to be exercised
142
against the states. Fitzpatrick warrants close attention as we prepare
to look at Hibbs because not only is it the source of the key principle
that Congress can abrogate sovereign immunity using its Section 5
power, but it is also a case in which the Court accepted the use of the
Section 5 power to remedy gender-based discrimination.
Fitzpatrick was decided in 1976, the same year the Court decided
143
both Craig v. Boren, which raised the level of scrutiny given classifica144
tions based on sex, and National League of Cities v. Usery, which carved
out an enclave of state immunity from commerce power legislation.
National League was an early, post-Warren Court foray into the enforcement of federalism values, authored by then-Associate Justice
Rehnquist. Thus, 1976 brought an increase of intrusion into the state
sphere because the states’ sex-based classifications would need to meet
a higher standard and because that standard would subject the states
to suits by individuals for retrospective relief under Fourteenth
Amendment statutes that express an intent to abrogate sovereign im145
munity; and 1976 brought a decrease in intrusion because, under

140

Id. at 456.
See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59-61 (describing instances in which the Supreme
Court had upheld congressional abrogation of state immunity).
142
Id. at 59 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)). By contrast, the
original Constitution was chiefly designed to enable Congress to bypass the states and
act directly upon individuals.
143
429 U.S. 190 (1976); supra text accompanying notes 89-99.
144
426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985). Another 1976 case written by then-Justice Rehnquist and also expressing federalism values was Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), which restricted federal rights claimants who sought remedies for mistreatment by the police.
145
The states were already subject to suits for prospective relief under Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), which requires naming a state official rather than the state
itself as the defendant. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-66 (1974) (distinguishing claims for retrospective relief from claims for prospective relief in Ex Parte
Young -type suits). The states had long been subject to suits brought by the federal
government, as opposed to private individuals.
141
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National League, some essential areas of state government became unreachable by the commerce power.
What did this dichotomy say about federalism? While originalists
will say that the difference in the history and the texts of the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment explain the different
146
treatment well enough, I would add that the dichotomy can also be
explained in normative federalism terms: The doctrine expressed a
belief in the importance of individual rights, as distinguished from
147
commercial arrangements, and the special role of the courts in vindicating them, quite apart from whether the democratic majority is
148
predisposed to protect them.
Fitzpatrick looked at the 1972 Amendments to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which expressly authorized private individual
claims for damages from state government for employment discrimi149
nation based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
Looking ahead to the line of Fourteenth Amendment power cases
150
that would begin with City of Boerne in 1997, one might wonder how
the 1972 Amendments to Title VII could fit within that power. In City
of Boerne, the Court designed a doctrinal tool to distinguish between
the substantive and the truly remedial, between the redefinition of
rights by statute, which the Fourteenth Amendment power will not
support, and a statutory remedy for the violation of constitutional
151
City of Boerne permits a truly remedial
rights as defined by courts.
146

Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66.
But see infra text accompanying notes 325-50 (discussing the controversy between the majority and the dissenting Justice Kennedy in Hibbs over whether the
FMLA is an enforcement of rights or simply an employment benefit).
148
Of course, the majority would have to provide the rights claimant with a statute
expressing an intent to abrogate sovereign immunity, so rights are important enough
to the Court to view Congress as having a power to overcome state majoritarian preferences, but not enough to solve the problem of a rights claimant who lacks democratic
support at the national level as well as the state level. See Ann Althouse, When to Believe
a Legal Fiction: Federal Interests and the Eleventh Amendment, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1123, 1124
(1989) (arguing that “the Court makes its difficult decisions in response to what it perceives as the federal interest at stake”).
149
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 447-48 (1976) (citing section 703(a) of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (Supp. IV 1970)). It is notable that the
Fitzpatrick opinion invariably refers to the authorization of suits in federal court, given
the way the Rehnquist Court would later require proper abrogation (or consent) to
bring federal claims in state court as well. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)
(emphasizing the substantive and not merely jurisdictional nature of sovereign immunity). There is concurrent jurisdiction in state as well as federal courts for Title VII
claims.
150
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
151
Id. at 527-29.
147
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statute to cover a “somewhat broader swath” of state activity than is
152
covered by Section 1 rights standing alone. Under the City of Boerne
doctrine, courts must ask whether a statutory remedy has “congruence
and proportionality” to violations of Section 1 rights, as those rights
153
As the line of cases following City of Boerne
are defined by courts.
showed, Congress may not act on the theory that the states might violate rights and that legislation should be in place to compensate victims
of those possible violations, it must have evidence that the states are
already presenting enough of a problem of violating rights that Con154
gress’s statute can fairly be seen as a response to that problem.
In the mid-1970s, however, the litigants apparently had no inkling
155
that requirements of that sort of stringency would come into play.
In Fitzpatrick the argument was entirely about whether Congress had
the power to abrogate sovereign immunity. “There is no dispute,” the
Court squirreled away in a little footnote, “that in enacting the 1972
Amendments to Title VII to extend coverage to the States as employers, Congress exercised its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth
156
Amendment.” Tantalizingly, this footnote includes a tacked-on “cf.”

152

See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000) (citing City of Boerne for
the proposition that “Congress’[s] power ‘to enforce’ the [Fourteenth] Amendment
includes the authority both to remedy and to deter violation of rights guaranteed
thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which
is not itself forbidden by the Amendment’s text”).
153
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
154
See infra text accompanying notes 197-266 (discussing Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), Morrison, Kimel, and
Garrett).
155
The key case at the time about the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment power
would have been Katzenbach v. Morgan, which upheld the Voting Rights Act of 1965, §
4(e), 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (2000), under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
384 U.S. 641, 658 (1966). Morgan is distinguished in the later case law. Infra text accompanying notes 180-86.
156
Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 453 n.9. The Court repeated the remark, with no elaboration in another footnote. See id. at 456 n.11 (“[R]espondent state officials do not
contend that the substantive provisions of Title VII as applied here are not a proper
exercise of congressional authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). Interestingly enough, in a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens did take on this question not
raised by the parties, and opined that the plaintiffs failed to “prove[] a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment,” and even expressed doubts as to whether the 1972 Amendments were “‘needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.’” Id. at
458 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651). Justice Stevens
agreed with the outcome on an Ex parte Young ground. Id. at 459-60. Justice Brennan
concurred in Fitzpatrick on the ground that no sovereign immunity survived the granting of the original powers to Congress. Id. at 457-58. That theory would be the basis
for the assault on Hans in the 1980s era cases. In a similar vein, Justice Brennan also
dissented in National League, putting forth a theory that would gain the majority in Garcia.
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citation to National League, presumably meant to acknowledge that the
commerce power does not fully reach the state activities and to suggest difficulties that would lie ahead—after Garcia overruled National
League—with respect to abrogating sovereign immunity using the
commerce power.
It is hard not to notice that the 1972 Amendments to Title VII
predated Craig’s announcement of heightened scrutiny for sex dis157
crimination claims. Even assuming that we can look back on actions
that were consistent with existing Supreme Court precedent and see
them retrospectively as violations of the Constitution, the Fitzpatrick
Court did not mention any evidence of state denial of equal protection rights attributed to sex discrimination. Justice O’Connor raised
this question during the oral argument in Hibbs to the counsel for the
state of Nevada, who pushed for strict application of the City of Boerne
test to the FMLA:
[W]hat about the Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer decision, where the Court unanimously found Title VII was a valid abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment immunity, and there was no inquiry into the history of gender discrimination, it was just accepted? Do you think that that case would
158
stand up under your analysis?

Because of Fitzpatrick, the Court in Hibbs would have a bit of a
struggle to deal with gender-based discrimination and the post-City of
159
Boerne Section 5 precedent. The problem would be compounded by
their later acknowledgment that “sex” had found its way into the statutory text not out of any congressional regard for real problems of sex
discrimination, but, as counsel for the United States would admit in
oral argument in Hibbs, “it was entered there as the legislative equivalent of the poison pill in order to attempt to kill Title VII, and so not

See Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 858 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that there should be no limit on Congress’s power under the Commerce
Clause based on “state sovereignty requiring or permitting judicial enforcement”).
157
See Post & Siegel, supra note 22, at 1951 (“It was only after Congress used its
lawmaking powers to validate the [feminist] movement’s understanding of equality
that the Court proved willing to modify its own Section 1 doctrine to protect citizens
against state action that discriminates on the basis of sex.”).
158
Oral Arguments at 1, Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972
(2003) (No. 01-1368), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/
argument_transcripts/01-1368.pdf. For further discussion of this line of questioning
in the oral argument, see infra text accompanying note 352-55.
159
See infra text accompanying notes 267-93 (discussing how the Court dealt with
the Family and Medical Leave Act).
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much evidence was put into the record regarding gender discrimina160
tion.”
So Fitzpatrick not only established that Congress could abrogate
sovereign immunity using its Section 5 power; it also created a fixed
point that, as we shall see, affected arguments about when Congress
could use Section 5 to remedy problems of sex discrimination.
C. The Doctrinal Shift Away From the Judicial Enforcement of
Federalism in the 1980s
In the 1980s, the Court erased the dichotomy represented by Fitzpatrick and National League when it overruled National League in Gar161
cia.
Garcia created the impression that Congress was the ultimate
162
arbiter of just how much autonomy the states would be permitted.
It seemed in the mid-1980s that the Court was ceding the enterprise of
federalism enforcement to Congress, and the decision in Union Gas, in
1989, which authorized Congress to abrogate sovereign immunity using the commerce power, reinforced this impression. But this move
toward the congressional enforcement of federalism values should not
have seemed very secure. Both Garcia and Union Gas provoked strong
dissenting opinions, joined by four Justices and peppered with predic163
Moreover, throughout the 1980s, a mations of future overruling.
jority resisted efforts to overrule Hans, the 1890 case that held that
state sovereign immunity survived in the original constitutional distribution of powers. In addition, federalism values proved quite vigorous

160

Oral Arguments at 45, Hibbs (No. 01-1368) (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)). The Court in Price Waterhouse refers to “[t]he somewhat
bizarre path by which ‘sex’ came to be included as a forbidden criterion for employment—it was included in an attempt to defeat the bill.” 490 U.S. at 244 n.9 (citing
CHARLES W. WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 115-17 (1985)).
161
469 U.S. 528 (1985); see also supra text accompanying notes 55-58 (discussing
the Garcia case).
162
This “political safeguards” model of federalism was articulated most prominently in Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
163
See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 29, 44-45 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (taking the position,
joined by the Chief Justice and Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, that the decision in
Union Gas “unstable” and predicting that it—or Hans—would be overruled); Garcia,
469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (refusing to “spell out further the fine
points of a principle that will, I am confident, in time again command the support of a
majority of this Court”); id. at 589 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (sharing the “belief that
this Court will in time again assume its constitutional responsibility”).
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throughout the 1980s in questions of deferring to state courts in the
164
enforcement of federal constitutional rights.
D. The Return to the Judicial Enforcement of Federalism in the Mid-Nineties:
Lopez, Seminole Tribe, and City of Boerne
The mid-1990s brought a trio of cases that reframed the Court’s
165
166
federalism analysis. Most conspicuously, in United States v. Lopez in
1995, the Court roused itself from its supine deference to Congress
and found the Commerce Clause inadequate to support a federal
167
statute. Lopez has been the subject of much commentary and need
164

See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989) (shielding much state court
interpretation of federal law from habeas review); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95, 113 (1983) (using standing and federalism-based restraint to restrict suits for
injunctions based on federal rights); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 97-98 (1980) (applying collateral estoppel to prevent civil claims for constitutional rights violations after
motions to suppress evidence in criminal trials). Like the preservation of Hans, this
countertrend in the 1980s federalism cases was produced by Justice White’s voting pattern, which is best understood as an endorsement of legislative power. The trend of
invigorating jurisdictional federalism doctrines began in 1971, at the dawn of the Burger Court, with Younger, which embraced “Our Federalism” and praised state autonomy, noting that things work best “if the States and their institutions are left free to
perform their separate functions in their separate ways.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37, 44 (1971). Younger provided that as a general rule state court criminal defendants
would need to raise their federal claims in the context of the state court proceeding.
Id. at 41. An exception was designed that would permit access to federal court upon a
showing of the state court’s inadequacy, a nice example of the shaping of doctrine
around the problem of the laggard state weighed against the potential benefits that
can be provided by the well-functioning state (in this setting, the state court). Id. at 45.
165
This doctrinal development began with Justice Thomas’s entry onto the Court
in 1992, a year that produced what could be seen as the first case in the line that would
reframe the Court’s federalism: New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). See Ann
Althouse, Variations on a Theory of Normative Federalism: A Supreme Court Dialogue, 42
DUKE L.J. 979, 1013-19 (1993) (commenting, inter alia, on New York v. United States).
Justice Thomas, by replacing Justice Marshall, who was a member of the majority in
Garcia and Union Gas, provided a fifth vote to the group of Justices who dissented in
Union Gas—Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy—all
of whom remain on the Court today. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor
were also both in dissent in Garcia. Along with them was Justice Powell, who later was
replaced by Justice Kennedy, and Justice Burger, who was replaced by Justice Scalia. It
is notable that unlike Union Gas, Garcia has not been overruled. I think that the Court
has simply found better ways to enforce federalism than the approach used in National
League. See Ann Althouse, On Dignity and Deference: The Supreme Court’s New Federalism,
68 U. CIN. L. REV. 245, 268 (2000) (expressing preference for current federalism doctrine over “tak[ing] the more drastic step of overruling Garcia”). The theory underlying Garcia, however, is clearly no longer believed by a majority of the Court.
166
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
167
See generally Althouse, supra note 54 (discussing the Lopez decision); Glennon,
supra note 52 (using Lopez as an example to assert that there has been a failure to see
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not detain us long here, but it is worth observing that the federal stat168
ute at issue in Lopez, the Gun-Free School Zones Act, imposed a uniform federal solution that displaced the states’ diversity and experimentation in an area that had not escaped their attention, where they
were not themselves contributing to the problem, and where there
169
was no particular benefit to be gained through a uniform rule. Not
only was Congress not responding to a problem of laggard states, but
Congress was also imposing only a traditional, harsh criminal pen170
alty. State and local governments, by contrast, were in the vanguard,
experimenting with solutions like gun-exchange programs and parental responsibility, as Justice Kennedy’s New State Ice -citing concurring
171
opinion pointed out.
172
The second of the three cases was Seminole Tribe v. Florida in
1996, which overruled Union Gas, making it thereafter necessary for
Congress to use Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in order to
abrogate sovereign immunity. The following year brought the third

that federalism has a regional component); Merritt, supra note 135 (arguing that Lopez
has narrow precedential value); Nagel, supra note 138 (expounding on federalism after
Lopez); Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally
Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554 (1995) (commenting that Lopez
gives little direction with regard to Congress’s commerce power).
168
18 U.S.C. § 922(9)(1)(A) (2000).
169
See supra text accompanying notes 49-53 (drawing attention to the Kennedy
concurrence that relies on New State Ice); see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (holding that the need to accommodate interstate travelers
justifies imposing a uniform national rule barring race discrimination in hotels),
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that for a production control to stabilize prices it must be accomplished at the national level).
170
Some might argue that gun control is the vanguard, but banning guns in schools
is scarcely an innovation: many states did the same, unsurprisingly, as Justice Kennedy
noted in his opinion in Lopez. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[O]ver 40 States already have criminal laws outlawing the possession of firearms on or near school grounds.”). The focus on school zones in the federal legislation occurred because the members of Congress who generally favored gun control
saw it as a way of averting opposition from gun control opponents. See J. MITCHELL
PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS: THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM 98-99 (2004) (noting the statement of a key drafter of
the bill that “[n]o Senator wanted to stand up for guns in schools”). The only “innovation” was in turning a traditional state law crime into a federal crime. The federalization of crime was unpopular with the Court because of the burden it imposed on federal courts, if nothing else. See, e.g., Lorie Hearn, Trying Times Are Ahead: Justice
O’Connor Says Federalization of Crime Could Overwhelm the Courts, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIBUNE, Aug. 17, 1994, at 1.
171
See supra text accompanying notes 49-53 (discussing the Kennedy concurrence).
172
517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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173

case, City of Boerne, which constricted the very power that Seminole
Tribe had just made newly important. City of Boerne was not itself a case
about sovereign immunity. Indeed, it arose in such a distinctive context that, even though Seminole Tribe had so recently drawn attention
to the sovereign immunity abrogation issue at stake in Fourteenth
Amendment interpretation, it would take further cases to make the
174
combined impact of Seminole Tribe and City of Boerne clear.
City of Boerne dealt with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
175
(RFRA), a statute explicitly designed to overrule a Supreme Court
decision. Shortly. after the Court had decided that neutral, generally
applicable laws that burden religion do not violate the Free Exercise
176
Clause of the First Amendment, Congress attempted to impose a
much higher standard—requiring a compelling state interest to justify
a substantial burden on a religious practice—than the Court had ar177
The text of RFRA openly proclaimed
ticulated in earlier cases.
Congress’s intention to “restore” the Free Exercise interpretation the
178
Court had so recently rejected.
Justice Kennedy, writing in City of Boerne, began his discussion of
permissible Section 5 legislation with a general quote from Fitzpatrick:
“Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall
within the sweep of Congress’s enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into ‘legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the
179
States.’”

173

521 U.S. 507 (1997).
See infra text accompanying notes 197-266 (discussing later cases in the City of
Boerne line).
175
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb to
2000bb-4 (2000).
176
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
177
For examples of cases imposing the much higher standard, see Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The Court in
Smith noted that the Sherbert approach to the Free Exercise Clause had been applied
inconsistently over the years. 494 U.S. at 882-84.
178
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2000). The constitutional problems with RFRA were
recognized early on by commentators. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G.
Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437
(1994) (arguing that RFRA was unconstitutional on both religious freedom and federalism grounds); William Van Alstyne, The Failure of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 DUKE L.J. 291 (1996) (arguing that Congress lacked power under Section 5 to enact RFRA).
179
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455
(1976).
174
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However, Justice Kennedy’s example of judicially approved en180
forcement was the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA).
Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964—the legislation upheld in Fitzpatrick—
181
was never even mentioned in City of Boerne. The VRA attacked racial
182
discrimination in voting by outlawing, inter alia, literacy tests, even
183
According to
though the Court had upheld their constitutionality.
City of Boerne, the VRA exemplified the proper use of the enforcement
184
185
power to reach “‘a somewhat broader swath of conduct’” than the
Section 1 right alone because of the extensive legislative record establishing that the state adopted these tests to perpetuate intentional
186
race discrimination. The courts had clearly outlawed race discrimination, motivating the states that wanted to practice it to end-run the
system, using methods that would be difficult for courts to perceive in
individual cases based on the Constitution alone. By defining the
“broader swath” of conduct, outlawing the devices that evidence
showed were being employed, and making it possible to control the
genuinely laggard states, the VRA, as understood by the Court, exemplified the proper use of the enforcement power.

180

42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-4 (2000).
In his Hibbs dissent, Justice Kennedy belatedly gave Title VII the stamp of approval, calling it “a legitimate congressional response to a pattern of gender-based discrimination in employment,” but did not elaborate. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v.
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1994 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). He relied on the Voting Rights
Act once again as the point of reference and drew attention to its particular limitations, without commenting on the lack of similar limitations in Title VII. Id. at 199294. Indeed, the FMLA appears to be a more tailored remedy for sex discrimination in
the workplace than Title VII in that it focuses on the area where stereotypes are most
intense—family and work. See infra text accompanying notes 341-43 (discussing the
majority’s defense of the FMLA on this ground); see also infra text accompanying notes
351-52 (discussing position taken by the state at oral argument, distinguishing Title VII
as regulation conduct reached by Equal Protection Clause standing alone).
182
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(2) (2000) (original version at § 4(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 1973b).
183
Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (upholding the facial constitutionality of literacy tests as a rational means to achieve intelligent ballot use).
184
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518-19. The power in question was Section 2 of the
Fifteenth Amendment, which is analogous to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
185
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1983 (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81
(2000)).
186
See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (listing measures protecting voting rights that
hindered states, but nevertheless were upheld in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1966), Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), and City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S.
156 (1980)). Justice Kennedy also cited a Prohibition-era Eighteenth Amendment case
upholding a ban on medical prescriptions as exemplifying the way the enforcement
power can be used. See id. (citing James Everard’s Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545
(1924)).
181
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Emphasizing the text and history of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in City of Boerne characterized the Section 5
187
power as remedial and not substantive.
With a nod to the idea of
deference to Congress, he announced the “congruence and proportionality” test that would prove so perplexing in later cases:
While the line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern, and Congress must have wide latitude
in determining where it lies, the distinction exists and must be observed.
There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to
188
be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.

City of Boerne primarily seems to express separation of powers values. The congruence and proportionality test was designed to detect
enactments that are really substantive—that is, that intrude on the
189
power of the judiciary “‘to say what the law is.’”
190
But City of Boerne also involved federalism values because enforcing a limit on Congress’s power here preserves a space in which state
and local government may experiment. The most comprehensible
distinction between the VRA and RFRA is not that one is truly remedial and the other is substantive, but that one is clearly designed to
identify and rein in laggard states that are conducting no legitimate
policy experiment, while the other is putting restrictions on states that
might very well be worthy laboratories of democracy. When it comes
to state action that burdens religion, it is exquisitely difficult to tell
who the laggards are and where the vanguard is. The facts of City of
Boerne illustrate the problem: A city that sought to protect the architecture in its historic district denied the request of a church that
191
Experimenting with architectural
wanted to enlarge its building.
preservation scarcely undermines our confidence in local democracy. Perhaps Congress was the real laggard here, providing “the
Church with a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic [could] ob192
Holding back congressional enthusiasm for expanding the
tain.”
187

Id. at 519-29.
Id. at 519-20.
189
Id. at 536 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
190
See Evan H. Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers,
53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1187 (2001) (noting the Court’s federalism concern as an alternate justification for City of Boerne, but finding its defense inadequate).
191
See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511-12 (describing the expansion plans of the
church).
192
Id. at 537 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding a violation of the Establishment
Clause).
188
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Free Exercise right, the Court in City of Boerne took the moderate approach of preserving room for state and local government to experiment.
E. Taking City of Boerne Seriously: Kimel and Garrett
As four subsequent cases would reveal, the City of Boerne test was
not limited to statutes like RFRA that defied Supreme Court precedent. The two post-City of Boerne cases that are most similar to Hibbs
193
are Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents and Board of Trustees of the Univer194
sity of Alabama v. Garrett, and these two cases will be given the most
attention here. There are, however, two other cases, Florida Prepaid
195
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank and
196
United States v. Morrison, worth considering.
Florida Prepaid was the first case to show that City of Boerne meant
something more than the simple proposition that Congress cannot
replace the Court’s articulation of constitutional law with its own in197
terpretation. Congress had attempted to allow individuals to bring
198
suits against the states for patent infringement.
But because Congress had failed to find a pattern of constitutional violations, the
199
200
Court held that the Patent Remedy Act did not fit Section 5. Not
only was there no showing of widespread patent violations, but even if
the states did violate patents, they would not be violating any constitutional right found in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, unless

193

528 U.S. 62 (2000).
531 U.S. 356 (2001).
195
527 U.S. 627 (1999).
196
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
197
This narrow interpretation of City of Boerne has been stated numerous times in
dissenting opinions and articles. For commentary critical of the Court’s extension of
the City of Boerne principle beyond this narrow scope, see Caminker, supra note 190, at
1132; Samuel Estreicher & Margaret H. Lemos, The Section 5 Mystique, Morrison, and the
Future of Federal Antidiscrimination Law, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 109, 156-57; Robert C. Post
& Reva B. Siegel, supra note 22, at 1947; Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 716
(2000). For articles generally approving of the Court’s approach, see Marci A. Hamilton & David Schoenbrod, The Reaffirmation of Proportionality Analysis Under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 469, 469 (1999); Rotunda, supra note 135,
at 1219.
198
527 U.S. at 630 (noting amendment to patent law expressing Congress’s intent
to abrogate sovereign immunity for patent infringement claims).
199
35 U.S.C. § 271(h), 296(a) (2000).
200
527 U.S. at 640-41.
194
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201

they also deprived the patent’s owner of due process. Congress’s interest in providing a uniform remedy in federal court was understandable and perfectly acceptable as a commerce power (or patent power)
enactment, but the states’ disuniform approaches to remedying such
deprivations were, according to the Court, all the process that is due a
202
patent owner as a matter of constitutional right.
Morrison might seem especially interesting for our purposes because it considered the scope of Section 5 as an enforcement of the
right against sex discrimination, which is also the issue in Hibbs. Unlike Hibbs and all of the other cases in the City of Boerne line, however,
Morrison looked at a statute that created a claim against private indi203
viduals. The Section 5 problem in Morrison was thus the lack of state
action. The statutory provision at issue, part of the Violence Against
204
Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), gave private individuals a federal right
of action against other private individuals for gender-motivated vio205
lence. Congress, acting a year before the Court decided Lopez, in all
likelihood assumed the commerce power easily authorized this provision. After the Lopez decision, a Section 5 argument was developed as
a back-up to the commerce power argument, in spite of the well
known Supreme Court precedents requiring state action for a viola206
The Court found it easy
tion of the Equal Protection Clause.
enough to say that to remove the state action requirement is to redefine the right, and redefining the right is clearly forbidden by City of
207
Boerne.
The Section 5 argument in Morrison did have an additional dimension. One could argue that the states were violating equal protection

201

Id. at 643-44, 646-47.
College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 681-82 (1999); see also Althouse, supra note 137, at 678-79 (describing the problem
identified in Florida Prepaid : unless the state fails to provide an adequate remedy, there
is no deprivation without due process).
203
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
204
42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
205
See § 13981(c) (“A person . . . who commits a crime of violence motivated by
gender . . . shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other relief as
a court may deem appropriate.”).
206
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621-25.
207
Id.
202
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by failing to take gender-motivated violence seriously enough and
that the private right of action was an appropriate remedy for that violation. In the majority’s view, however, even if law enforcement policies and priorities could be considered a widespread pattern of equal
protection violations, giving a private right of action would not be a
209
“congruent and proportional” remedy because the remedy bypassed
the supposed state offenders, doing nothing to penalize or reshape
their behavior, and concentrated entirely on the private individuals,
who committed wrongs, but who have not violated constitutional
210
rights.
The supposed remedy in fact left the laggard state free to
211
continue lagging, with no incentive to change its ways.
212
In Kimel, the Court found that Section 5 would not support the
213
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), which
208

Id. at 624-25. The Court referred to the legislative history of the Civil Rights
Acts of 1871:
The chief complaint is not that the laws of the State are unequal, but that even
where the laws are just and equal on their face, yet, by a systematic maladministration of them, or a neglect or refusal to enforce their provisions, a portion
of the people are denied equal protection under them.
Id. at 625 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. 153 (1871) (statement of
Rep. Garfield)).
209
Id. at 625-26.
210
Id. at 621. The majority’s view can be understood as holding that the state deserves control over its traditional tort law, which was not shown to be inadequate. I
suspect that the Court is particularly sensitive to the federalization of torts (as well as
crimes) because of the heavy burden these laws place on the federal courts. See Ann
Althouse, Inside the Federalism Cases: Concern About the Federal Courts, 574 ANNALS 132,
134-36 (2001) (exploring the theory that concerns about burdening the federal courts
have, in part, motivated the Court’s constriction of Congress’s Section 5 power as well
as its commerce power).
211
The proposal to create an all-gay high school in New York City, supra note 3,
represents a similar kind of remedy in that it is an attempt to bypass the real problem
rather than to cure it. The all-gay high school is presented as a solution to harassment
of gay teens, but it fails to take aim at the harassment problem. By the same token, the
section of VAWA stricken down in Morrison did not aim at the real problem of the
states’ purported failure to take violence against women seriously enough. Both the
all-gay high school and the federal cause of action authorized under VAWA institutionalize a bypass for a problem, removing the pressure to correct it. It arguably rewards those who are causing the problem, as the harassers succeed in driving the
group they disfavor out of the high school and the state avoids the costs of dealing with
violence against women in their own courts.
212
528 U.S. 62 (2000).
213
29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2000). The Act outlaws age discrimination against people over forty in employment situations. Id. § 623(a)(1), § 631(a). The ADEA does
permit age discrimination if it “is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the particular business.” Id. § 623(f)(1). The
ADEA did exclude state and local officials at the “policymaking level,” law enforcement
officers and firefighters. Id. §§ 623(j), 630(f)(A).
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214

Congress had extended to the states in 1974. The commerce power
215
already supported the ADEA, and it is unlikely that Congress considered or could have considered any collision with Supreme Court
precedent. Sovereign immunity doctrine had not firmed up to the
216
point where it was understood that abrogation would be necessary
and that it could not be accomplished simply under the commerce
217
power. Nor had the Court begun to issue opinions on the degree of
scrutiny the Equal Protection Clause requires for discriminatory age
218
restrictions. In the years since 1974, the Court has repeatedly called
for the lowest level of scrutiny, which leaves the states free to draw a
line based on age as long as they have a “rational basis” for doing so.
Quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, the Kimel Court wrote that it
cannot be said that age is “‘so seldom relevant to the achievement of
any legitimate state interest’” that age classifications must be “‘deemed
219
Thus, a state could rely on
to reflect prejudice and antipathy.’”

214

528 U.S. at 68. The ADEA was enforceable against the states through an
amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, § 28, 88 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2)
(2000)). The FLSA amendment redefined the term “employer” to include the states,
and it was argued that the change amounted to an abrogation of sovereign immunity.
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 68-69. Because of the need to put the various statutory provisions
together, there was some disagreement on the Court about whether Congress had
manifested a sufficiently clear intent to abrogate sovereign immunity. Ultimately, the
majority concluded, however, that “Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate.” Id. at 78. The Court requires that Congress make its intention to abrogate
sovereign immunity “‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’” Id. at 73
(quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989)).
215
See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 (1983) (“The extension of the ADEA
to cover state and local governments . . . was a valid exercise of Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause.”).
216
The Court’s decision in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), announced on
March 25, 1974, a few weeks before the Amendments were enacted, had established
that Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), could not be used as a means of obtaining
retrospective relief from the state. Edelman focused attention on the need to abrogate
sovereign immunity, which led to the decision two years later in Fitzpatrick.
217
See supra text accompanying notes 172-74, (discussing Seminole Tribe’s restriction
on the commerce power).
218
The Kimel Court cites three age discrimination cases, the oldest of which was
decided in 1976, two years after the application of the ADEA to the states. Kimel, 528
U.S. at 83 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S.
93 (1979); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976)).
219
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83 (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 440 (1985)). The Court also states the rational basis test this way: “‘[W]e will not
overturn such [government action] unless the varying treatment of different groups or
persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes
that we can only conclude that the [government’s] actions were irrational.’” Id. at 84
(quoting Vance, 440 U.S. at 97). “[B]ecause an age classification is presumptively
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“imperfect generalizations,” permitting it, for example, to mandate
retirement of judges at a particular age rather than provide for some
220
sort of individual assessment of fitness.
By setting the scrutiny at the lowest level, the Court expressed its
low degree of suspicion about age-based classifications. The older
221
persons are not a “discrete and insular minority,” and virtually everyone not already in the class hopes to enter it someday. The low level
of scrutiny shows that the Court does not presume “prejudice and
antipathy” from the mere use of the classification, but requires a
demonstration that only “prejudice and antipathy” motivated the state
222
Congress may reject line-drawing
to draw a particular age line.
based on age using its commerce power—as it in fact has with the
ADEA—but that its disapproval of age discrimination does not transform the practice into a constitutional rights violation. In 1974, the
223
states engaged in plenty of age discrimination.
Yet, under the
Court’s interpretation of equal protection, only instances of irrational
discrimination—discrimination based on nothing but “prejudice and
antipathy”—could count toward the “widespread pattern” of rights
224
With that as the foundation for using Section 5, soverviolations.
225
eign immunity abrogation failed in Kimel. The Court acknowledged
rational, the individual challenging its constitutionality bears the burden of proving
that the ‘facts on which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be
conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker.’” Id. (quoting Vance, 440
U.S. at 111).
220
See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 473 (“The people of Missouri rationally could conclude
that the threat of deterioration at age 70 is sufficiently great, and the alternatives for
removal sufficiently inadequate, that they will require all judges to step aside at age
70.”).
221
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83 (citing Mass. Bd. of Ret., 427 U.S. at 313-14 (citing United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-153, n.4 (1938))).
222
See id. (“Age classifications, unlike governmental conduct based on race or
gender, cannot be characterized as ‘so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect
prejudice and antipathy.’” (quoting Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440)).
223
Id. at 90.
224
Id.
225
Id. Of course, the remedy of providing a claim for all age discrimination covered by the ADEA could not be proportionate, because there were no constitutional
violations to remedy. Supporters of abrogation tried to argue that the Act’s bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception was a sufficient tailoring of the act to the
constitutional right. Id. at 86-87. But this exception still left far more in the category
of proscribed behavior than just irrational discrimination. See id. at 87 (stating that the
standard for the BFOQ exception is “one of ‘reasonable necessity,’ not ‘reasonableness’” (quoting Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 419 (1985))). As the
BFOQ exception had been interpreted, it was quite difficult to establish and was deliberately constrained. To qualify for the BFOQ exception, the employer must show that
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that “[d]ifficult and intractable problems often require powerful
226
remedies,” but demanded that the problems amount to constitutional violations before Section 5 could be used.
In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
227
Breyer, expressed a different vision of federalism. Rather than preserving room for the states to engage in different practices, Justice
Stevens took the position that has characterized the liberal side of the
Court since Garcia: it is the role of Congress to decide what should be
228
left to the states and what should be done at the federal level. This
view of federalism has repercussions in separation of powers doctrine,
since the argument that Congress sets the federalism balance can be
restated as the argument that the Court is aggrandizing itself by in229
truding into the congressional sphere.
Justice Stevens gave some consideration to the states’ activities in
the vanguard of antidiscrimination policy—all fifty states had passed
230
age discrimination laws —but was not dissuaded from his broad view
of congressional power. He argued that “[w]henever Congress passes
a statute, it does so against the background of state law already in
place; the propriety of taking national action is thus measured by the
metric of the existing state norms that Congress seeks to supplement

its reliance on an age restriction is because “‘it is highly impractical . . . to insure by individual testing that its employees will have the necessary qualifications for the job.’” Id.
at 87 (quoting Western Air Lines, Inc., 472 U.S. at 422-23).
226
Id. at 88.
227
Id. at 92 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). This opinion
concurred with the conclusion that the statute stated an unmistakably clear intent to
abrogate, and thus only dissented in part. In addition, Justice Stevens restated his opposition to Seminole Tribe, calling it “profoundly misguided,” and announced his unwillingess “to accept [it] as controlling precedent.” Id. at 97-98.
228
Id. at 96 (“In my judgment, the question whether those enforcement proceedings should be conducted exclusively by federal agencies, or may be brought by private
parties as well, is a matter of policy for Congress to decide.”).
229
Id. at 95 n.3 (arguing that the majority’s view aggrandizes the power of the judicial branch and is in opposition to safeguarding state sovereignty). Along with this
analysis comes concern about the “enlargement of the federal bureaucracy” to provide
the enforcement that is lost if individuals cannot sue. Id.; see also Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (questioning whether the expansion of the federal bureaucracy, which the majority’s doctrine might necessitate,
would better promote state sovereignty or individual liberty). Thus, by curtailing the
legislative branch of the federal government, the Court enlarges not only the judicial
branch, but also, potentially, the executive branch, a consequence that this side of the
Court portrayed as bad federalism.
230
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 94 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part)
(noting that all fifty states have some sort of age discrimination laws but that twentyfour of them have failed to extend its protection to public employees).
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231

or supplant.”
Justice Stevens was willing to trust Congress to pay
232
“nuanced attention” to the interests of the states, to “use its broad
range of flexible legislative tools to approach the delicate issue of how
to balance local and national interests in the most responsive and
233
Because Congress had this ability, it was “quite
careful manner.”
234
evident” that it was not the Court’s role to protect state interest. In
this view, the Court was “simply aggrandiz[ing] the power of the Judi235
cial Branch.”
It is easy enough to translate this separation of powers argument
back into federalism-speak. Consider this statement, made in an earlier ADEA case by Chief Justice Burger:
It has been suggested that where a congressional resolution of a policy question hinges on legislative facts, the Court should defer to Congress’s judgment because Congress is in a better position than the Court
to find the relevant facts. While this theory may have some importance
in matters of strictly federal concern, it has no place in deciding between
the legislative judgments of Congress and that of the Wyoming Legislature. Congress is simply not as well equipped as state legislators to make
236
decisions involving purely local needs.

How can one decide who has the better argument, Chief Justice
Burger or Justice Stevens? I think the choice will necessarily reflect
one’s beliefs about vanguards and laggards. If one thinks the states
are likely to move in the vanguard direction or if one has doubts
about where the vanguard is, and thus can value diversity, the Chief
Justice’s argument will seem appealing. If, however, one has confidence that there is one congressionally identifiable, vanguard position
on most issues or if one worries that the states tend to be laggards, Justice Stevens’s argument will seem convincing.

231

Id. at 94.
Id.
233
Id. at 94-95.
234
Id. at 95. Though the reasoning is in the form of institutional analysis, at this
point Justice Stevens attributed the reasoning to the will of the Framers. Id.
235
Id. at 95 n.3. For further elaboration of Justice Stevens’s argument, see supra
note 227.
236
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 263 n.8 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted). The majority addressed only the question of whether the commerce
power supported the ADEA. Because it found the commerce power adequate, despite
the difficulties presented by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), it did
not address the Section 5 issue. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 243. The Chief Justice did so in
his dissent. Id. at 260-63 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (finding that no rights in the Constitution or the Court’s precedent supported the imposition of the ADEA on the states
and that Congress lacks the power to define rights).
232
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One year after Kimel, the Court issued a very similar opinion in
237
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, this time ad238
As in
dressing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).
Kimel, the Court held that a statute designed to protect individuals
from employment discrimination did not fit within Section 5 and con239
sequently could not abrogate sovereign immunity. Also as in Kimel,
the statute purported to enforce equal protection with respect to a
240
classification that was subject only to minimal scrutiny, but because
Cleburne struck down an ordinance that discriminated against the
mentally disabled, there was some reason to see potential for a differ241
ent result in Garrett. The Cleburne Court, while purporting to apply
only minimal scrutiny, rejected a law that required a permit to operate
242
a group home for the mentally disabled. It called the law an expression of “mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors
243
which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding.” Yet Cleburne
did not provide enough of a foundation to argue that the failure to
make accommodations for the disabled violated equal protection.
These omissions suggest inattention and budgetary constraint, not
244
mere “prejudice and antipathy” toward the disabled.
It was therefore not possible to produce the evidence of a widespread pattern of
violations that could make the ADA look like an appropriately con245
gruent and proportional remedy.
237

531 U.S. 356 (2001).
42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 (2000). The Court limited its opinion to Title I of
the Act, which covered employment discrimination, though the parties had also argued over Title II of the ADA, which covers “services, programs, or activities of a public
entity.” Id. § 12132. The Court expressly left open the question whether Section 5
supports Title II. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360 n.1. Title I bars employment discrimination
against the disabled and requires the employer to make “reasonable accommodations.”
§ 12112(b)(5)(A).
239
See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364-65 (describing the Section 5 analysis).
240
See id. at 366 (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), for
the proposition that the mentally retarded are not a quasi-suspect class under the
Equal Protection Clause and that legislation directed at the group incurs only rational
basis review).
241
See Seth P. Waxman, Foreword: Does the Solicitor General Matter?, 53 STAN. L. REV.
1115, 1123-24 (2001) (noting the contemporaneous belief that “Garrett offered the
Court an opportunity to stop—or at least to slow—the progression of restrictive Section Five rulings” because the “precedents—particularly Cleburne—were noticeably better” and “[t]he legislative record of discrimination against the disabled . . . was considerably more complete than . . . the record . . . in Kimel”).
242
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
243
Id. at 448.
244
Id. at 440.
245
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374.
238
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How important was it that at the time Congress passed the ADA all
246
of the states had laws barring discrimination against the disabled?
The Court drew attention to Congress’s own praise for the states’ work
at the vanguard. It quoted one remark from the legislative history:
“this is probably one of the few times where the States are so far out in
247
front of the Federal Government, it’s not funny.” But when the federal law did go further than many of the states’ laws, it was clearly not
aimed at any real problem of laggard states. The point of the federal
statute was to impose uniformity, looping the states into what the text
of the statute itself called a “comprehensive national mandate for the
248
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”
Congress had compiled a record supporting its conclusion that
“historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals
with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a seri249
ous and pervasive social problem.”
But there were problems with
the legislative record. The discriminatory actions of private employers
do not satisfy the Section 5 doctrine, and, as the Court now asserted,
the actions of local government officials could not justify the remedy
of abrogating sovereign immunity because sovereign immunity does
250
not protect local government. With all discrimination by local officials and private employers excluded from consideration, only six in251
stances of state discrimination remained, and it was not clear
whether any of them would amount to constitutional violations under
252
minimal scrutiny.
The Garrett Court did not look closely at any
of those six incidents to determine if they really were constitutional
246

Id. at 368 n.5.
Id. (quoting Discrimination Against Cancer Victims and the Handicapped: Hearing
on H.R. 192 Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Educ.
and Labor, 100th Cong. 5 (1987) (statement of Rep. Moakley)).
248
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000).
249
§ 12101(a)(2).
250
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369 (citing to Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530
(1890), which stated that “the Eleventh Amendment does not extend its immunity to
units of local government”).
251
See id. (noting six incidents of discrimination against state employees including
two cases of state universities refusing work to a blind person, one case of a state transportation department firing a person with epilepsy, one state university paying deaf
employees less, and one state informing a job applicant that she would need to disclose
a hidden disability). The Court rejected evidence from the early twentieth century of
states involvement in sterilization of those perceived to have mental impairments as
outdated. Id. at 369 n.6.
252
See id. at 370 (questioning whether the incidents would be considered irrational
under the Court’s decision in Cleburne, which adopted a standard of minimal scrutiny).
247
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violations, however, because even if they all were, one could still conclude, as the Court did, that there was no widespread pattern of constitutional violations capable of supporting a remedy as extensive as
253
As the Court noted, there are more than four million
the ADA.
state employees, and given the prevalence of disabilities under the
ADA’s broad definition, states must have made a huge number of de254
In this
cisions affecting employees with disabilities over the years.
light, as the Court concluded, the absence of significant discriminatory
evidence should make one quite hesitant to indulge in a reflexive
belief that the states act on mere “prejudice and antipathy” toward the
255
disabled.
Justice Breyer, in his dissent, called attention to many other pur256
ported incidences of state discrimination against the disabled.
But
to the majority this material was worthless: it was only a collection of
“unexamined, anecdotal accounts of adverse, disparate treatment by
257
state officials.” There was no evidence that they were actually viola258
tions of constitutional rights, and disparate impact alone is not sufficient to establish an equal protection violation even with respect to clas259
sifications subject to the highest scrutiny.
Congress had not even
bothered to mention these other incidents in the ADA’s findings, an
260
omission that the majority found significant.
Unlike the majority,
the dissenters were willing to look at this collection of incidents, assume
a widespread antipathy toward disabled workers, and “just accept” that

253

See id. at 370-72.
See id. at 370 (noting that Congress found that “some 43,000,000 Americans
have one or more physical or mental disabilities” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1))).
255
See id. (“It is telling, we think, that given these large numbers, Congress assembled only such minimal evidence of unconstitutional state discrimination in employment against the disabled.”).
256
Id. at 379 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
257
Id. at 370 (citation omitted).
258
Id. at 370-71. The Court noted that most of the accounts were submitted not to
Congress but to the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with
Disabilities and that the accounts were not adopted by Congress in its legislative findings. Id. at 370-71. Moreover, the Court noted that few of the items related to state
employment decisions; but most were problems with public accommodations and
transportation. Id. at 371.
259
Id. at 372-73; see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (holding
that racially disproportionate effects without racially discriminatory purpose do not
violate the Equal Protection Clause).
260
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 371 (“[H]ad Congress truly understood this information as
reflecting a pattern of unconstitutional behavior by the States, one would expect some
mention of that conclusion in the Act’s legislative findings. There is none.”).
254
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261

the states had participated in it.
Only “prejudice and antipathy”
aimed at the states—those laggards!—could support such a conclu262
sion.
Even if one could say that the states’ actions amounted to a widespread pattern of rights violations, the ADA imposed a remedy that, in
the view of the majority, was too far out of proportion to the rightsviolation problem: “[T]he accommodation duty far exceeds what is
constitutionally required in that it makes unlawful a range of alternate
263
responses.” The majority showed interest in giving the states room
to look for their own solutions to local problems where the states are
264
Even if we asnot demonstrated to be laggards resisting progress.
sume the states need to move in the direction of protecting the interests of the disabled—that we are sure we know which way progress
lies—there is still potential for positive experimentation. Once the
ADA is in place, beginning to solve the problem, it reshapes everyone’s mindset: the “indifference or insecurity” that once prevailed is
replaced by a new awareness. Perhaps that is enough to set the states
265
“on the path to a more decent, tolerant, progressive society.” Freeing the states from individual lawsuits for retrospective relief—which
is all Garrett does, since the ADA still binds the states as a valid commerce power statute—can be seen in a positive light, at least by those
not plagued with fears that the states will slip back into their laggard
266
ways.
261

Id. at 371-72.
The concurring opinion written by Justice Kennedy and joined by Justice
O’Connor took the problem of antipathy toward the disabled more seriously than the
main opinion: “[K]knowledge of our own human instincts teaches that persons who
find it difficult to perform routine functions by reason of some mental or physical impairment might at first seem unsettling to us, unless we are guided by the better angels
of our nature.” Id. at 375 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy resisted impugning those ordinary feelings as necessarily the product of “malicious ill will.” Id. at 375.
They may arise instead out of “indifference or insecurity.” Id. While not the loveliest
manifestations of human character, they did not amount to constitutional violations.
263
Id. at 372.
264
Id.
265
Id. at 375 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Note how that statement reflects confidence about which way the vanguard goes. Justice Kennedy referred to the ADA as a
“milestone” on that path of progress. Id.
266
Litigation consumes state resources and can produce defensive behavior. Saving the states from litigation frees up state money and energy to devise what may be a
vanguard policy of their own. The Court called attention to the litigation burden imposed by the Act, which “makes it the employer’s duty to prove that it would suffer
such a burden, instead of requiring (as the Constitution does) that the complaining
party negate reasonable bases for the employer’s decision.” Id. at 372; see also Althouse, supra note 210, at 132 (analyzing recent federalism cases in terms of hostility to
262
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Kimel and Garrett represent strict application of doctrine, but more
importantly, they represent a specific vision of normative federalism.
As we shall see, the majority in Hibbs brushes off these two precedents,
purportedly because they dealt with attempts to enforce constitutional
rights to be free of discrimination based on classifications subject only
to rational basis review.
III. VANGUARD CONGRESS, LAGGARD STATES?—REMEDYING
TRADITIONAL STEREOTYPES WITH FAMILY LEAVE
A. The Problems Presented in Hibbs: Does Heightened Scrutiny
Change Everything?
267

Hibbs raised the question of whether Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment supported the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
268
(FMLA), which guarantees eligible employees, including state employees, twelve weeks of leave annually to attend to certain needs of
269
close family members. Though the case seemed destined to follow
Kimel and Garrett in the City of Boerne line of cases, six Justices—including Chief Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the opinion—viewed the FMLA
as appropriate Section 5 legislation that enforces the constitutional

litigation); Vicki C. Jackson, Seductions of Coherence, State Sovereign Immunity, and the Denationalization of Federal Law, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 691, 706-18 (2000) (noting the Court’s
hostility to litigation as a tool of government accountability).
267
Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003). The case was
brought by William Hibbs against his former employer, the Nevada Department of
Human Resources. Id. at 1977. The state had in fact granted him twelve weeks leave
to care for his wife, who had been injured in a car accident. Id. Warned that he had
consumed the allotted leave and faced termination, Mr. Hibbs lost his job when he
failed to return to work. Id. Because the sovereign immunity issue lay at the threshold
of the case, none of the courts that handled the case ever reached the merits of
whether the state had in fact violated the act. Id.
268
29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2000).
269
29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2000). The Court held that by authorizing suits for
damages “against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State
court of competent jurisdiction,” § 2617(a)(2), and defining “public agency” to include both “the government of a State or political subdivision thereof” and “any
agency of . . . a State, or a political subdivision of a State,” id. §§ 203(x),
2611(4)(A)(iii), Congress made the requisite “unmistakably clear statement” in the
text of the FMLA of its intent to abrogate sovereign immunity. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at
1977; see also Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989) (requiring that Congress
make an “unmistakably clear statement”). Thus, there was no opportunity to use statutory interpretation to avoid the constitutional question of whether the FMLA fit into
Congress’s Section 5 power. In Hibbs, the district court had held abrogation, and the
Ninth Circuit, in conflict with other circuits, had disagreed, prompting the United
States Supreme Court to grant certiorari. 123 S. Ct. at 1977.
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right against sex discrimination. Straining to harmonize the City of
Boerne line of cases with Fitzpatrick and relying heavily on the form
270
heightened scrutiny took in the VMI case, the Court accepted the
FMLA as that “somewhat broader swath of conduct” that Congress
may regulate in a genuine effort to remedy violations constitutional
271
rights.
The existing Section 5 doctrine should have demanded that Congress demonstrate that the requirement of substantial leave, given
equally to men and women, operates as a remedy for actual, widespread violations of equal protection rights by the states. Under Kimel
and Garrett, there should have been a record of equal protection violations occurring and presenting a problem to which the twelve-week
leave is “congruent and proportional.” It should not have been
enough, given the City of Boerne line of cases, that the states had failed
to act affirmatively to relieve women of the burdens of family care or
to provide men with incentives to take over more of the family responsibilities that have traditionally fallen on women. What the states had
done with respect to general policy or individual decisions should
have amounted to a widespread pattern of equal protection violations
under the judicial interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Moreover, the twelve-week leave needed to be creditable as a way to
cure these violations, not merely a kindly new benefit to ease the difficulties of balancing work and family.
Surely, women have historically taken the primary role in family
272
care, a responsibility that has had a great effect on their working life.
Those who advocate the equal participation of women in the workplace necessarily care deeply about the special burdens and difficulties
posed by family care and quite appropriately petition the democratic
institutions of government for laws that seem likely to advance this
273
cause. The FMLA is just such an enactment. Yet the ADEA and the
ADA were similar enactments—hard-won legislation advancing the interests of older and disabled workers—which, under Kimel and Garrett,
274
Hibbs purports to distinguish those
Section 5 would not support.
270

United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996).
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1979.
272
Id. at 1978 n.2.
273
For a discussion of whether entitlement to unpaid leave necessarily advances
women, see infra text accompanying notes 331-32.
274
See supra text accompanying notes 212-66 (discussing the Court’s findings that
the ADEA and the ADA, as applied to the states, were not proper legislative enactments under Congress’s Section 5 power and thus, could not abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity).
271
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precedent cases by relying on the heightened scrutiny applicable to
sex classifications. Quoting the VMI case, the Chief Justice emphasized that “‘overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females’” were no longer accept275
able.
The Court acknowledged that this heightened scrutiny was a rela276
tively recent phenomenon. Until the 1970s, a narrow conception of
the constitutional right preserved a wide field for state experimentation, including adherence to policies that reflected the traditional be277
lief that women belonged in the “‘center of home and family life.’”
The Chief Justice’s opinion in Hibbs recognized that the Court had
278
long sanctioned these state laws, and that it was only in 1971, in Reed
279
v. Reed, that it had begun to reveal to the states that sex classifications would need to meet anything more than the most deferential
scrutiny; and it was not until Craig in 1976 that the Court announced
280
So until the 1970s, states that took
the intermediate scrutiny test.
due care to align their practices with the requirements of the Constitution had reason to think they could espouse a traditional conception of sex roles—adopting policies that forthrightly treated men and
women differently in accordance with the belief that women belonged
in the bosom of the family.
Congress made sex discrimination in the workplace illegal in Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and extended that bar to state employers in 1972, still four years before the Court adopted intermediate
281
scrutiny for sex discrimination in Craig. Thus, as the Hibbs majority
275

Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1978 (quoting Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533). This distinction
would not satisfy Justice Kennedy, who dissented, contending that the majority had
compromised the federalism values by failing to take the City of Boerne doctrine seriously. Id. at 1987 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also infra text accompanying notes 32560 (outlining the debate between Justice Kennedy, who considered the twelve-week
leave requirement to be a benefit program, and the majority, which considered it to be
a remedy for rights violations).
276
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1978.
277
Id. (quoting Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961)).
278
Id.; see e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding a Michigan law
restricting women from tending bar); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419, n.1 (1908)
(approving state laws limiting the hours women could work); Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (upholding an Illinois statute barring women from practicing
law).
279
404 U.S. 71 (1971).
280
See supra text accompanying notes 89-99 (discussing Craig and its introduction
of the intermediate scrutiny standard).
281
See supra text accompanying notes 139-60 (discussing Fitzpatrick’s Fourteenth
Amendment analysis in the context of Title VII).
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recognized, Congress was the vanguard in defining the right to be free
of sex discrimination in the workplace, years ahead of the Court,
though the Court later defined a constitutional right to equal protection with respect to state employers that coincided with the statutory
282
right. The original Title VII, which reached only private employers,
could tap only the commerce power, so no question would have arisen
about intruding into the judicial sphere of saying what constitutional
283
rights are. The 1972 amendments could have been characterized as
284
Commerce Clause enactments as well, but given the presence of
state action, the Fourteenth Amendment also became a source of leg285
islative power. At the time these statutory amendments were passed,
Congress could not have thought that it was enforcing a right the
Court had defined, nor could the states have been on notice that their
sex discrimination in employment practices had been laying the
groundwork for congressional power to use the Fourteenth Amendment to craft a new, intrusive remedy. But, as we have seen, the
286
Court, in 1976, in Fitzpatrick, “just accepted” that these amendments
fit the Congress’s enforcement power as it announced the power to
abrogate sovereign immunity.
Fitzpatrick seemed to exert at least as much pressure as the City of
Boerne-Garrett cases on the Hibbs majority. At the time Fitzpatrick was
decided, however, it was easy to assume without seeing any evidence
that Congress passed the 1972 Amendments against a backdrop of widespread sex discrimination by state employers—albeit discrimination the
states had reason to believe did not violate constitutional rights. This
widespread sex discrimination was so obvious and well known that no

282

Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1978-79 (describing the history of statutes outlawing sex discrimination and judicial interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause).
283
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
284
Between 1976 and 1985, however, Tenth Amendment problems would have
arisen under National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which was overruled
nine years later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528
(1985).
285
With respect to private employers, the Court interpreted the Commerce Clause
expansively. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302 (1964) (finding that a restaurant that sold food that had traveled in interstate commerce had enough of a “substantial economic effect on interstate commerce” to support a federal ban on race discrimination). The Court’s accommodating response to Congress’s historically
momentous statutes gave rise to an overconfidence that the Court would continue to
view the commerce power so broadly that it would accommodate any statute Congress
might have the will to enact.
286
See supra text accompanying notes 157-60 (discussing oral arguments in Hibbs).
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one even bothered to argue otherwise in litigating Fitzpatrick.
The
Fitzpatrick Court paid no attention to the fact that none of its cases had
ever warned the states that their long-accepted practice of sex discrimination would be seen as constitutional violations, giving Congress new power over them. Yet it was advance warning, with time allowed for experimenting with their own policies, that appealed to
288
Chief Justice Rehnquist so much in the VMI case.
Congress enacted the FMLA in 1996, thirty years after the Court
had put the state “on notice” that sex classifications would need to be
substantially related to important state interests and thirty-four years
after Title VII specifically banned sex discrimination by the states in
289
When Fitzpatrick was decided in 1976, it may have
employment.
made perfect sense to assume widespread sex discrimination in state
employment. But after all of those years of the states coming to terms
with the demands of Title VII and heightened constitutional scrutiny,
one might think that it would take a serious demonstration, with probative evidence, to establish that in 1996 there was a widespread pattern of constitutional violations that warranted the remedy of guaranteed family leave.
After so many years, to fail to meet the
requirements of gender equality is truly to lag behind and invite a
federal remedy. By the same token, however, the passage of three
decades with substantial remedies already in place suggests that the
requirements had been internalized—at least enough to prevent a
widespread pattern of violations.
Chief Justice Rehnquist needed to harmonize his own opinions
in Fitzpatrick and the VMI case with the strict requirements that had
290
His solution was to
developed in the City of Boerne line of cases.

287

Supra text accompanying note 158. If Fitzpatrick is to be taken at face value, Section 5 doctrine cannot be about whether Congress has the right attitude toward Supreme Court precedent at the time it enacts a statute. It must be acceptable for Congress to propose an expansive new interpretation of rights, as long as the courts will
later agree with that interpretation.
288
See supra text accompanying notes 109-18 (analyzing the Chief Justice’s reasoning in his concurrence in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 558-66 (1996)).
289
See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1978-79 (2003) (discussing the purpose and legislative history of the FMLA).
290
To that, we should add the Chief Justice’s concurring opinion in Craig, in
which he expressed sympathy toward a state that was experimenting with a policy that
did not burden the traditionally advantaged group. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 21920 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In Hibbs, the main violation of due process he
relies on is the excessive accommodation of women’s requests for leave in relation to
men’s. 123 S. Ct. at 1979. See also supra text accompanying notes 96-99 (discussing
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s varying analyses in the gender discrimination cases).
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emphasize the subtle form that discrimination takes after it has be291
come illegal. A state that wanted to continue its practice of sex discrimination would go below board. Subtle approaches to discrimination, like the literacy tests and similar devices used to perpetuate race
discrimination in voting, are hard for the courts to ferret out in individual cases alleging constitutional violations. Because of this difficulty, the less perceptible the violations are, the more room there is
for Congress to act. A statute outlawing a “broader swath” of behavior
is exactly appropriate in this situation. Paradoxically, the Court’s special competence in articulating the meaning of rights creates the setting for judicial incompetence if states, on hearing new pronouncements of rights, respond not with compliance but with stealth.
Constitutional violations then become difficult to prove, so a prophylactic statutory remedy, penalizing more than just the constitutional
violation, becomes appropriate under Section 5.
Since increasing the intrusion into state autonomy when there is
less evidence of discrimination apparent on the surface seems to be a
raw deal for the states, it is especially important for Congress to establish in the legislative record that the states have in fact opted for preserving their old ways in a cloaked fashion. It is entirely out of keeping with the vision of federalism embraced in cases from City of Boerne
through Garrett to continue to “just accept” that the states are still engaging in widespread sex discrimination rather than to consider seriously whether they have actually adapted their behavior to the constitutional requirements the courts have announced and Congress has
292
embodied in statutes like Title VII. Even if Hibbs involved an area of
heightened scrutiny, the Court should still have looked for a widespread pattern of constitutional rights violations commensurate with
the twelve-week leave entitlement.
Heightening of scrutiny of a particular classification amounts to an
expression of confidence about where the vanguard is. It tells the states
which way they must go and calls a halt to experiments reaching in
other directions. Why not assume that the states respond with understanding and acceptance of the supremacy of federal law? Heightening
291

123 S. Ct. at 1978-79. Interestingly, the Chief Justice relied on a case from 1973
to support the notion that subtle discrimination persists in 1993. Id. (citing Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)).
292
Clearly Congress amassed this sort of evidence to justify the Voting Rights Act,
and there it was enforcing a constitutional right that called for the highest level of
scrutiny. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652-53 (1966) (reviewing congressional enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause in the context of the right to vote
using a rational basis test).
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scrutiny does give the laggard states the news that they must disguise
behavior they once openly displayed. As we have seen, the new incentive to disguise behavior justifies prophylactic federal legislation that
regulates a broader field of activity in order to protect the constitutional rights that the laggard state will violate secretly. But the City of
Boerne doctrine should remain a serious tool precisely because it
should not be assumed that states are laggards who respond to new
requirements by moving below board. Under City of Boerne, prophylactic federal legislation must be premised on evidence that there
really are laggard states and that the “broader swath” needs to be cut
to reach them because they have decided to proceed by stealth. Unless there is a “widespread pattern” of continuing violations of Section
1 rights, the states should be permitted the freedom to accommodate
the requirements of federal law, to accept the direction in which that
law has pointed them, and to produce a new set of experiments test293
ing what good policy is.
B. No Worthy Experiments Here: States as Rights Violators
Generating Federal Power
According to the Hibbs majority, Congress had evidence that
“[s]tates continue to rely on invalid gender stereotypes in the employment context, specifically in the administration of leave bene294
fits.”
There was at least some evidence in the legislative record of
leave policies that explicitly favored women, but it scarcely amounted
to a demonstration of widespread constitutional violations by the
states.
The key item of evidence cited in Hibbs was a survey of private employers, showing favoritism toward women in granting new parent
leave, which the majority was willing to assume reflected a stereotype
295
Justice Kennedy, dissenting, considered this
that states also used.
293

There is surely some difficulty in perceiving this freedom as a positive or even
workable solution given that the legislation is a valid commerce power enactment,
binding the states, even though retrospective relief is not available. For a discussion of
this problem, see infra text accompanying notes 379-81.
294
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1979.
295
Id. at 1979. (citing a 1990 Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) survey, S. Rep. No.
103-3, at 14-15 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 17). This survey showed that,
while maternity leave was not that prevalent (only thirty-seven percent of the surveyed
employers offered it), it was twice as common as paternity leave (provided by only
eighteen percent of the surveyed private employers). Id. The Court also perceived
a widening “gender gap,” based on the previous year’s BLS survey, which showed
thirty-three percent of private sector employers gave maternity leave, while only sixteen
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survey to be “the only factual findings the Court cites.” Justice Kennedy objected to the majority’s inference that state practices would be
297
similar to those of private employers because, he insisted, the states
298
had been in the vanguard in extending leave policies. Compare the
way the Kimel Court addressed the same matter:
[T]he United States’ argument that Congress found substantial age discrimination in the private sector . . . is beside the point. Congress made
no such findings with respect to the states. Although we also have
doubts whether the findings Congress did make with respect to the private sector could be extrapolated to support a finding of unconstitutional
age discrimination in the public sector, it is sufficient for these cases to
note that Congress failed to identify a widespread pattern of age dis299
crimination by the States.

The majority opinion in Hibbs made much of the argument that
the states had relied on discretionary decision making and, in doing
300
so, had been more generous to women than to men. The opinion
referred to testimony, made during 1987 Senate Hearings on an earlier leave bill, that “‘the lack of uniform parental and medical leave
policies in the work place has created an environment where [sex]
301
From the legislative history for FMLA
discrimination is rampant.’”
percent gave paternity leave. Id. Yet, in fact, these numbers should not give rise to a
concern that the trend is toward treating men differently from women because paternity leave as a percentage compared to maternity leave increased (48.48% in 1989 and
48.65% in 1990) and paternity leave increased by a greater percentage from one year
to the next than did maternity leave (12.5% for paternity leave and 12.1% for maternity leave).
296
Id. at 1987 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
297
Id. at 1988. There was some testimony that state employers behaved the same
way, id. at 1979 n.3, but it was testimony “made during the hearings on the proposed
1986 national [parenting] leave legislation, [which] preceded the [FMLA] by seven
years.” Id. There was also testimony from the earlier consideration of the Parental and
Medical Leave Act of 1986 by the Washington Council of Lawyers that “parental leave
for fathers . . . is rare. Even . . . where child-care leave policies do exist, men, both in the
public and private sectors, receive notoriously discriminatory treatment in their requests
for such leave.” Id. at 1979 (alteration in original). Justice Kennedy faulted this testimony because it was not part of the FMLA record, it was testimony about a bill that offered only parental leave and because, at seven years old, it lacked probative value with
respect to conditions at the time of the enactment of the FMLA. Id. at 1988 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
298
Id. at 1989.
299
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 90 (2000); see also Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 640 (1999) (finding
no widespread patterns of patent violations by the states).
300
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1980.
301
Id. (quoting Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1987: Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Children, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism of the Comm. on Labor and Human Res. (pt. 2),
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itself, there was a report that, the majority noted, showed that Congress “was aware of the ‘serious problems with the discretionary nature
of family leave,’ because when ‘the authority to grant leave and to arrange the length of that leave rests with individual supervisors,’ it
leaves ‘employees open to discretionary and possibly unequal treat302
ment.’” In other words, the discretionary approach creates the possibility that discretion may be abused, which is not itself evidence of
abuse, only a banal observation about the nature of any discretion.
Given that the Court has made individual treatment the touchstone of
gender equality, it seems unusually unfair to blame the states for having a policy of individual decision making! Moreover, as Justice Kennedy argued, there was no proof that the states intentionally favored
303
women in their discretionary decisions. That the majority nevertheless accepted this evidence as sufficient betrays a loss of interest in ju304
dicial control of the definition of constitutional rights.
The case law from City of Boerne to Garrett demanded evidence of
violations of constitutional rights sufficient to make this new and generous employee benefit look like nothing more than a remedy for
those violations. Here, the majority’s argument was to connect the
disparate treatment to a belief in the traditional stereotype that
305
women rather than men care for newborns. Obviously, to some extent, special regard for new mothers comes from a real, physical difference. The physical recovery from pregnancy and childbirth justifies some disability leave; indeed, failure to give leave for this reason

100th Cong. 173 (1987) (statement of Peggy Montes, Executive Director, Mayor’s
Commission on Women’s Affairs, City of Chicago).
302
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 103-8, pt. 2, at 10-11 (1993)). Justice Kennedy, in
dissent, complained that this report relied on a study of federal workers. Id. at 1989
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). He took special exception to the assumption that the states
behaved like the federal government because, he believed, the states were in the vanguard in developing family leave. Id. The majority rejected this point because it was
not enough for the states to have developed leave, to be operating in the vanguard the
states would have needed to develop leave in a way that broke down traditional sex
roles. Id. at 1980-81; see infra text accompanying notes 307-11 (discussing the states’
leave practices).
303
Id. at 1989 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
304
Whether consciously or not, the Court, in loosening its control over the definition of constitutional rights, has responded to the most persistent criticism of the City
of Boerne line of cases; see supra note 197 (discussing the academic scholarship critical
of the Court’s expansion of the City of Boerne doctrine).
305
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1979 & n.5 (noting that the “differential leave policies were
not attributable to any differential physical needs of men and women, but rather to the
pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family members is women’s work”).
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would violate the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
Why then
did the states’ efforts at avoiding discrimination against pregnant
women generate evidence of equal protection violations that could be
used to impose the remedy of leave for both parents?
Prior to the enactment of the FMLA, the states had been dealing
with the question of family leave on their own, reflecting local needs
and preferences, perhaps channeling traditional ideas about what is
“woman’s work.” Were these state policies flawed enough to show a
widespread pattern of rights violations? Seven states had leave provi307
sions that related only to women, but three of these concerned
308
solely pregnancy disability leaves, where giving women a benefit denied to men cannot be considered an equal protection violation. A
fourth state, Louisiana, had a statute offering women a four-month
309
pregnancy disability leave, “which far exceeds the medically recom310
mended pregnancy disability leave period of six weeks.” That left a
problem with only three other states—Massachusetts, Kansas, and
Tennessee—and the problem arose from giving parental leave to only
311
women.
The key to avoiding this constitutional violation seems to be to
give exactly the right amount of pregnancy leave to women. Hibbs accepts the finding in the legislative history of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act “establishing four to eight weeks as the medical recovery
312
period for a normal childbirth.” If a state should feel inclined to be
more generous to new mothers than is strictly required by the physical
recovery period—as “established” by Congress—then it would run afoul
of the Equal Protection Clause, unless it gave leave to new fathers as
well. Though under the City of Boerne line of cases Congress is not
permitted to define constitutional rights, somehow the legislative

306

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1980.
308
Id. at 1990 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The majority opinion implicitly conceded
this point. Id. at 1981 n.6.
309
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1008(A)(2) (repealed 1997).
310
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1981 n.6.
311
Id. at 1991 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Neither men nor women received family
leave, a failure that does not violate equal protection. The majority opinion implicitly
backed up this assertion. Id. at 1981 n.6. It is not clear from the case whether the “parental leave” related primarily to new mothers in Kansas and Tennessee; however, the
Massachusetts statute related to childbirth and adoption.
312
Id. at 1979 n.4 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-28, pt. 1, at 30 (1989) (emphasis
added)).
307

2004]

VANGUARD STATES, LAGGARD STATES

1809

assessment of the length of pregnancy disability drew a line that affected constitutional analysis.
The majority’s assessment of the evidence hinged on the very particular problem of maternity and paternity leave. For the FMLA to
square with the City of Boerne line of cases, however, the much more
general family leave needed to be “congruent and proportional” to
constitutional violations. Yet, the majority simply took the maternity/
paternity leave evidence and generalized, finding a “gender stereotype:
313
Respondthat women’s family duties trump those of the workplace.”
ing to criticism from Justice Kennedy, who pressed for a serious appli314
cation of the City of Boerne test, the Court claimed to be making an
easy leap: “because parenting and family leave address very similar
situations in which work and family responsibilities conflict, they im315
plicate the same stereotypes.”
After finding a “state-sanctioned stereotype that only women are
316
responsible for family caregiving,” the majority did not require that
the stereotype be inaccurate. In fact, the evidence showed that
317
women do carry far more than half of family responsibilities. A state
313

Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1979 n.5.
Id. at 1986 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
315
Id. at 1979 n.5. In dissent, Justice Kennedy charged the majority with “set[ting]
the contours of the inquiry at too high a level of abstraction.” Id. at 1989 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). Yet it was Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority this past Term in Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003), who took what is perhaps the most striking step
up the ladder of generality in recent memory. In Lawrence, he criticized the decision
in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), for its “failure to appreciate the extent of
the liberty at stake” when it spoke in terms of “whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.” Lawrence, 123 S. Ct.
at 2478. Justice Kennedy insisted on a more abstract formulation of the right at stake:
To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual
conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to
have sexual intercourse . . . When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate
conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution
allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.
Id. at 2478. In Lawrence, Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices Scalia and Thomas, stayed at the low generality level, a choice that works to limit rights and give more
of a role for states in policymaking. These Justices emphasized state legislatures as the
appropriate decision makers with regard to individual liberty, which allows the community to express moral opprobrium through legislation. Id. at 2488 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
316
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1983.
317
See id. at 1983 (noting that “[t]wo-thirds of the nonprofessional caregivers for
older, chronically ill, or disabled persons are working women” (quoting H.R. REP. NO.
103-81, pt. 1, at 24 (1993))).
314
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policy designed to relieve women of burdens they actually carry was now
tarred as unconstitutional because presumably as in the VMI case, it
318
It
follows a generality and does not treat persons as individuals.
even seems to suggest that a state’s failure to act affirmatively to eradicate traditional sex roles—to pursue policies that push men to take
more responsibility in the home—is enough of a constitutional problem to empower Congress under Section 5! The majority conflated
the stereotype about what women actually do (which was clearly true,
though not necessarily in an individual case) and the stereotype about

318

Supra text accompanying notes 94-103. There is a more recent case than United
States v. Virginia that seems to permit a stereotype to affect the decision of an individual
case. In Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001), the Court rejected a challenge to a federal
statute that made it harder for the offspring of a male citizen, who was not born in the
U.S., to become a U.S. citizen than the offspring of a female citizen otherwise similarly
situated. Specifically, under 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4) (2000), the father must take one of
three formal steps to acknowledge the child’s paternity before he or she reaches eighteen.
The Justices divided up quite differently in Nguyen than in Hibbs. All three dissenters
from Hibbs were in the majority in Nguyen, joined by two members of the Hibbs majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens. The four dissenters in Nguyen were all
from the Hibbs majority. Interestingly enough, no one in Hibbs, not even Justice Kennedy, who wrote for the majority in Nguyen, cites Nguyen. The Nguyen Court, applying
“the equal protection guarantee embedded in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment,” invoked the intermediate scrutiny test and found it unnecessary to consider whether a lower level of scrutiny applies in the context of immigration and naturalization. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57. The Court identified two governmental interests
assuring that there is (1) a biological relationship and (2) a “real” parent-child relationship. Id. at 54. As to both of these interests, the majority saw mothers and fathers
as differently situated, not by mere stereotype, but because there is no anatomical assurance of the father’s presence at the time of birth. Id. at 64. Though the interest in
assuring that there is a biological relationship could have been served by a DNA test,
the majority refused to read the Constitution to limit Congress to that one method of
insuring biological fatherhood. Id. at 54. As to the second interest, the mother’s necessary presence at the birth also made her inherently different from the father, who
may not even know that conception took place. Id. The Court took special note of the
large number of young military men overseas as well as the “ease of travel” and concluded that the Constitution did not “require Congress to ignore this reality.” Id. at
54-55. What happened to the argument that this was the product of traditional stereotypes about the male and female role with respect to childrearing? In the particular
case the Court considered, the father had in fact raised the child, but had failed to
take the required formal step. Id. at 53. Why was he not allowed to show these individualized facts, much like how an individual applicant to VMI had to be allowed to
show her fitness rather than to be judged by a traditional stereotype? The majority’s
answer was simply that the difference was physical, relating to the specific difference of
pregnancy. Id. at 70. The Court asserted that “[n]one of our gender-based classification equal protection cases have required that the statute under consideration must be
capable of achieving its ultimate objective in every instance.” Id. It was enough that
there was sufficient fit between the statute and appropriate governmental ends, particularly where vast numbers of decisions about individuals needed to be processed.
Id. at 70-71.
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what women should do. Thus, a state that might have seen itself in the
vanguard, by reaching out to meet the special and real needs of
women, was painted as the laggard on the theory that it was reinforcing the idea that this is what women are supposed to do. The majority’s word “responsible”—which can mean either taking responsibility
or owing responsibility—neatly accomplished the conflation.
The Court fairly breezily observed that there are stereotypes still
in force, paid little, if any, attention to whether these stereotypes
were producing actual rights violations, and gave Congress free rein to
319
Even with the
impose policies aimed at eradicating stereotypes.
heightened scrutiny given to sex classifications, this attitude toward
the evidence does not resemble the approach taken in City of Boerne,
320
Florida Prepaid, Kimel, or Garrett.
Compare the Court’s attitude with the position taken by Justice
Brandeis in his New State Ice dissent that the Court should hesitate to
call things rights violations, leave a field of autonomy for state experimentation, and view the results of that experiment, not as evidence of rights violations, but as practical evidence about how to de321
Does a judge look at the states and see the vanguard
sign policy.
experimenters searching for solutions to real-world problems who
should not be hemmed in by too many rights? Or does the judge look
at the states as underhanded, “subtle” discriminators, likely to do
harmful things, upon whom the judges should look with skepticism
and whose actions judges should interpret as justifying federal legisla322
tion to control them?

319

Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1979-81.
Justice Kennedy, urging that these cases be taken seriously, wrote in his dissent
that “the charge that a State has engaged in a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination against its citizens is a most serious one. It must be supported by more than conjecture.” Id. at 1988-89 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
321
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
322
The Court’s treatment of affirmative action in Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct.
2325 (2003), suggests that these kinds of concerns affect decision making. There, the
Court deferred to the state law school even though it used racial classifications, subject
to the highest level of scrutiny, in its admissions policy. Something motivated the
Court to look with favor on the state in Grutter, to credit it as a worthy experimenter
helping to search for answers to problems for which the Court hesitated to dictate a
hard-line solution. Id. at 2347. Of course, Grutter, like New State Ice, lacked the complication of a congressional policy in conflict with the state’s experiment. But see
PHILIPPA STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM 72-99 (1993) (detailing Justice
Brandeis’s opposition to large institutions, including the work of Congress); G.
EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 276-84 (2000) (describing
Justice Brandeis’s “skepticism of large institutions, including the federal government”
320
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There was no recognition in Hibbs that a state might, without engaging in mere sex stereotypes, genuinely think that more than eight
weeks are needed to recover from pregnancy and childbirth or might,
quite apart from stereotypes about who ought to take care of a baby,
want to facilitate breast-feeding for a period longer than eight
323
weeks. The Court made it impossible for the states to engage in this
kind of policymaking. Far from keeping the field of experimentation
uncluttered, as Justice Brandeis wanted, the Court has now accepted
boxing in the state with a combination of constitutional law, which he
rejected, and expansive federal statutory requirements, which he was
324
not even contemplating.
C. Benefit Program or Proportionate Remedy?
In his dissent, Justice Kennedy wrote that the twelve-week leave
325
requirement was “not a remedy but a benefit program.” The majority disagreed, contending that the benefit program functioned as a
remedy for the rights violations that Congress had supposedly detected. “By creating an across-the-board, routine employment benefit
for all eligible employees, Congress sought to ensure that family-care
leave would no longer be stigmatized as an inordinate drain on the
workplace caused by female employees, and that employers could not

and presuming his support for the states as laboratories entailed an openness to challenges to federal legislation).
323
See Liz Galst, Babies Aren’t the Only Beneficiaries of Breast-Feeding , N.Y. TIMES, June
22, 2003, § 15, at 4 (noting the developing scientific evidence indicating that breastfeeding offers greater health benefits to children as well as to mothers). It is puzzling
that there is no mention in the briefs or in the opinions of the issue of breast-feeding,
which entails a real physical difference that can justify treating new mothers differently
from fathers. The importance of accommodating breast-feeding women in the workplace should not make it seem invidious to support a new mother who wants to take a
longer leave to procure this health benefit for herself and the infant, instead of struggling with breast-pumping or bringing the infant into the workplace. That medical
research is developing in this area suggests the value of leaving room for experimentation with maternal leave policies.
324
See WHITE, supra note 322, at 279 (noting that Justice Brandeis’s support for
progressive state interpretation should not be interpreted to mean that he would support similar legislation at the national level and that in fact Brandeis “was not sympathetic toward the Roosevelt administration’s experiments” and “did not believe the
remedy [to economic problems] was to have the federal government emerge as a regulatory force in the nation’s economy”).
325
Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1987 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
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326

evade leave obligations simply by hiring men.” According to the majority, this remedy is “congruent and proportional” to what Garrett
327
called a “targeted violation” of constitutional law. In that view, the
FMLA was like the Voting Rights Act; Congress had just taken on a
328
“difficult and intractable problem.”
Broader swath cutting was in
order as the actual constitutional swath had proven too difficult for
courts to locate. In this way of thinking, it was focused and sensible
for Congress to respond to this entrenched prejudice against
women—employers—regarding them as an “inordinate drain” on the
329
workplace —by creating a routine entitlement. If all workers, male
and female, could, without seeking special accommodation, tap into
their ample guaranteed leave, and if taking family leave came to be
seen as ordinary employee behavior, women who continued to take
leave would no longer be stigmatized. As the majority saw it: “FMLA
attacks the formerly state-sanctioned stereotype” and, as a consequence, diminishes the incentive to avoid hiring and promoting
330
women.
Of course, if there is a guaranteed benefit but only women choose
to take it, the ample entitlement will contribute to the perception of
331
women as a drain on the workplace. The supposed remedy for the
stereotype could end up reinforcing it. But perhaps that problem falls
within the realm of things Congress can do with its power: it can
make wrong decisions about how a particular policy will work and expect courts to refrain from correcting such blunders. Perhaps the
Court’s Section 5 idea is only to demand that Congress genuinely address a constitutional rights violation and not define a new violation.
Perhaps the doctrine only asks whether Congress was really thinking
in remedial terms or whether it had an ulterior rights-expanding motive. The question is whether they have properly accessed a particular
326

Id. at 1982; see also id. (“By creating an across-the-board, routine employment
benefit for all eligible employees, Congress sought to ensure that family-care leave
would no longer be stigmatized as an inordinate drain on the workplace caused by female employees, and that employers could not evade leave obligations simply by hiring
men.”).
327
Id. (quoting Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374
(2001)).
328
Id. (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88 (2000)).
329
Id.
330
Id. at 1982-83.
331
See 139 CONG. REC. S985 (1993) (statement of Sen. Kassenbaum) (“[M]andating leave will have a negative impact on [employment] opportunities for
women. . . . Employers . . . will seek to hire workers with lower benefit costs, increasing
the pressure to discriminate against women.”).
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power source, not whether they have wisely chosen what to do with it.
Being wrong about whether a remedy will work, one might say, is different from lacking a remedial attitude at the time one makes the mis332
take.
333
The statute permits the states to give additional leave, which
gives the states some autonomy, provided they continue the push in
what is now the officially designated vanguard direction. Justice Kennedy drew attention to the fact that Congress did not bother to express a requirement that any additional leave be given on a gender334
neutral basis. The majority did not think much of this criticism because other laws in force at the time of the FMLA’s enactment—the
Equal Protection Clause itself as well as Title VII—already required
335
This response, however, was unfair to Justice
nondiscrimination.
Kennedy. His point was that the failure to state the nondiscrimination
principle displayed Congress’s lack of interest in the stereotypeeradicating program that was supposed to be central to its purpose.
In Justice Kennedy’s view, if Congress had the proper remedial attitude, it would not have made a reference to the state’s power to give
greater benefits without stating the antidiscrimination principle, even
though such a statement would only repeat requirements already imposed by the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII.
The option of offering no leave at all has of course been rejected:
the twelve-week entitlement has become the floor. But in thinking
about what remedy was genuinely proportionate to the violations of
constitutional law actually presented in the record, one ought to wonder why the correct answer was not a simple ban on sex discrimination
in the event that the state chose to provide a leave benefit beyond the
basic pregnancy disability leave. That solution would have targeted
the problem that turned up when Louisiana gave too much postchildbirth leave and when Massachusetts, Kansas, and Tennessee offered parental leave only to women. Why was it acceptable to force all
fifty states to give twelve weeks of leave to remedy such flaws? The
332

This way of looking at the problem clearly forefronts separation of powers and
minimizes the importance of federalism in the analysis of Section 5 cases. See supra
text accompanying notes 189-92 (discussing the role of separation of powers and federalism in City of Boerne).
333
See 29 U.S.C. § 2651(b) (2000) (“Nothing in this Act or any amendment made
by this Act shall be construed to supersede any provision of any State or local law that
provides greater family or medical leave rights than the rights established under this
Act.”).
334
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1992 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
335
Id. at 1984 n.12.
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majority contended that allowing a state to offer no leave at all would
336
be a disproportionate remedy for the violations found. The Chief Justice wrote: “Where ‘two-thirds of the nonprofessional caregivers for
older, chronically ill, or disabled persons are working women,’ and
state practices continue to reinforce the stereotype of women as caregivers, such a policy would exclude far more women than men from
337
the workplace.”
So, according to the evidence, the stereotype is not an incorrect
generalization: a fair-minded person talking about what women generally do would say they take more family time. This truth, and not
mere prejudice, would continue to stoke the belief that women need
to take a lot of family time away from work. The remedy was thus justified by the Court as a way to change the reality of women’s responsibilities.
How can that be considered a way to eliminate the states’ constitutional violations? One needs to say that it is a constitutional violation
to judge an individual based on a sex stereotype and that changing
the reality will make it less likely that the individual will be judged this
way. The remedy attacks the stereotype itself by trying to make it less
true (as a generality) rather than attacking the practice of judging individuals by general characteristics believed to be true of the group,
338
The hope
which seems to be the relevant constitutional violation.
seems to be that the leave entitlement will change the reality, that
men and women will come to share family care responsibilities, and
that at some point in the future, women will not be stigmatized as a
drain on the workplace. By then, even though the state might still
judge individual women by reference to the group stereotype, the
old stereotype will have been expunged. It might not work, as dis339
cussed above, and it is quite a strained argument. It is much easier
to see the FMLA as a simple entitlement program. Clearly, the Court
felt motivated to approve the FMLA under Section 5, and this is the
theory it produced to portray the leave as a true remedy for a rights

336

Id.
Id. at 1983 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 103-8, pt. 1, at 24 (1993); S. REP. NO. 103-3,
at 7 (1993)).
338
See supra text accompanying notes 100-20 (discussing sex classification claims as
attacking unfounded stereotypes).
339
See supra text accompanying notes 331-32 (noting the potential ineffectiveness
of a leave remedy in the event that it is used most often by women).
337
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violation understood in terms of failing to treat female employees as
340
individuals.
The majority’s strongest argument distinguishing Hibbs from City
of Boerne, Kimel, and Garrett was that the statutes involved in those cases
were extraordinarily broad, covering every activity the state might en341
gage in as an employer.
By contrast, as the Court put it, “FMLA is
narrowly targeted at the fault line between work and family—precisely
where sex-based overgeneralization has been and remains strongest—
342
and affects only one aspect of the employment relationship.” Thus,
even though the twelve-week requirement is extravagant, at least it
sticks to the problem of balancing work and family, which really does
powerfully affect the advancement of women in the workplace. This
argument is unlikely to satisfy anyone who takes the City of Boerne line
of cases seriously, for it largely underscores a political goal—the progress of the interest group that procured the legislation, which was at
343
stake in Kimel and Garrett as well. But it does show that the remedy
chosen has some focus and limitation, which was missing in those earlier statutes.
The Hibbs majority also credited Congress for including other
344
limitations. Only unpaid leave is required. Leave is only available to
employees who have been on the job for at least one year and who
have worked at least 1250 hours in the previous year, and it is not
345
available to certain high-level employees. Moreover, advance notice
340

Upholding the FMLA after the Kimel and Garrett cases is likely to stir suspicion
that the Court is deciding cases based on political preference. For pre-Hibbs expressions of such suspicion, see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Listening to the “Sounds of Sovereignty” but Missing the Beat: Does the New Federalism Really Matter?, 32 IND. L. REV. 11, 12
(1998); Michael Wells, Naked Politics, Federal Courts Law, and the Canon of Acceptable Arguments, 47 EMORY L.J. 89, 121-23 (1998).
341
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1983.
342
Id.
343
One could make a similar argument about eradicating stereotypes with respect
to age and disabilities. Even if only rational basis scrutiny applies, the Hibbs attitude
toward the “congruence and proportionality” test might support the attenuated causal
chain between forcing the inclusion of the aged and disabled persons in the workplace
and eradicating irrational fears about them.
344
29 U.S.C. § 2612(c)(1) (2000). One might think that the unpaid nature of the
leave makes it disproportionate, since women may have a greater capacity to take advantage of unpaid leave. If men are unwilling to use unpaid leave, the remedy will not
work as described to eradicate the stereotype. Though mandatory leave may still be
considered a nice benefit, if this occurs it should be criticized on the ground that it
makes the stereotype stronger. As discussed above, it may not matter under the City of
Boerne doctrine whether the remedy is effective, but only whether the legislature acted
with a duly remedial attitude.
345
Id. §§ 2611(2)(A), (B)(i).
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346

is required for foreseeable leaves, and certification of medical
347
conditions may be required. One limitation that the Court thought
demonstrated special attention to the needs of the states was the ex348
clusion of elected officials, their staffs, and appointed policymakers.
Attention to the financial needs of the employer is shown by
the limited damages: employees may recover only their actual monetary loss, and back-pay amounts are limited by the two-year statute of
349
The Court likened these limitations to the geographic
limitations.
350
limitation and the sunset aspects of the Voting Rights Act. Are they
really the same sort of limitations? The VRA limitations were designed to target the laggard states, while leaving the unoffending
states unburdened, but the FMLA’s limitations are a more generic sort
of moderation.
The state’s brief in Hibbs had faulted the FMLA for lacking a termination provision like the VRA remedies: “The absence of a sunset
provision leads to the absurd result that States, like Nevada, that provide FMLA-type family-care leave as a matter of state law are treated
as if they purposefully engage in a pattern of unconstitutional conduct
351
or irrationally deny leave.” But if this were the case, how could Title

346

Id. § 2612(e).
Id. § 2613.
348
See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1983-84 (2003) (applying 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e)(2)(C); 2611(2)(B)(i), (3) (2000)).
349
29 U.S.C. §§ 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)–(iii); 2617(c)(1), (2). The Court noted that the
attention to the employer’s finances attends to sovereign immunity concerns. See
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1984 n.12 (noting that Congress chose a “middle ground,” attending to the interests of both families and employers). Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion highlights this value. See id. at 1986 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that
the Section 5 question arises in “the context of the Eleventh Amendment, which protects a State’s fiscal integrity from federal intrusion by vesting the States with immunity
from private actions for damages pursuant to federal laws”). Justice Kennedy’s opinion
for the majority in Alden v. Maine spelled out this concern about the “financial integrity of the states” in greater detail. 527 U.S. 706, 750 (1999). Justice Kennedy found
normative value in sovereign immunity because it permitted the state to structure its
own finances to balance the many demands on its treasury. Id. at 749-52. He saw individual lawsuits against the states as impinging on the “State’s most fundamental political processes, [striking] at the heart of the political accountability so essential to our
liberty and republican form of government.” Id. at 751. He characterized private lawsuits, even private lawsuits in state courts, as a way in which the federal government
compels the states and displaces democratic state government. Id. at 751-52.
350
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973(b)(a)(8), (b)(b) (2000).
351
Brief for the Petitioner at 37, Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003) (No. 01-1368); see
NEV. REV. STAT. § 284.360(5) (Michie 2003) (permitting up to twelve weeks of family
leave).
347
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VII continue to apply indefinitely? The question arose at the oral
argument:
[I]f the discrimination doesn’t exist anymore in the State, even if it did
at one time, then the provision would have to sunset, and as far as Title
VII is concerned, many States, the vast majority of States have their own
Title VII laws, so at this point in time I guess, under your reasoning, Fitz352
patrick and Bitzer would have to go.

In reply, the State’s counsel attempted to argue that no time limit
would be needed because Title VII “closely hewed” to the Section 1
353
The suggestion was that the Kimelrights the Court has defined.
Garrett requirements do not apply when Congress is only proscribing
354
the activities that Section 1 already proscribes. When Congress cuts
that broader swath, however, regulating additional behavior with prophylactic legislation, the state argued that the requirements need to
355
be temporary. There would need to be a way for the states, like the
southern states that went below-board with their race discrimination
in voting, to regain their autonomy in areas that are not governed by
constitutional rights. This argument pulled no weight in the Hibbs
written opinion. In the Court’s view, it would seem, there is nothing
special about the time limitation in the Voting Rights Act, and the
power to reach the “broader swath of conduct,” once the states have
generated the evidence of constitutional rights violations, can con356
tinue in perpetuity.
Justice Scalia, in his dissent, argued for a geographic type of limitation, like that found in the Voting Rights Act, which Congress
crafted to cover only the states shown to have a history of intentional
357
race discrimination. Even if the statute could be upheld on its face
352

Oral Argument Transcript at 11, Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003) (No. 01-1368),
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcript/011368.pdf.
353
Id.
354
Id. at 10-11.
355
Id.
356
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1983 (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82
(2000)).
357
Id. at 1985 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia credited Congress with an
awareness—perhaps only an intuition—of this limitation, which he calls “self-evident.”
Id. The fact that Congress narrowly framed one statute, however, does not establish
that it knew that the Constitution required that limitation. Other motivations for limited remedies do exist, most obviously the self-interested desire of legislators to keep
their own states free of the burdens of the new law. Surely, even if Congress did believe this sort of tailoring was a constitutional requirement, the Court would not
rely solely on congressional interpretation. Indeed, the whole point of this Section 5
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as a “congruent and proportional” remedy—and he did not think that
it could—Justice Scalia would have required a litigant to demonstrate
that each particular state had a record of constitutional violations be358
No
fore Section 5 could abrogate that state’s sovereign immunity.
matter how vast the record of violations by the states as a group, as
long as no record exists with respect to a particular state, it could assert the defense of sovereign immunity and resist claims for retrospec359
In Justice Scalia’s view, the states did not deserve to be
tive relief.
lumped together, vanguards with laggards. They are not “some sort of
360
collective entity which is guilty or innocent as a body.”
C. Sorting Out the Vanguards and Laggards
How did ideas about vanguard states affect the Court’s decision?
Justice Kennedy characterized the states as the vanguard: Congress
had used state leave policies as a model in devising the federal ap361
proach, some states had leave policies even broader than the FMLA,
and the evolution of leave policy at the state level had “picked up tre362
But the majority saw things
mendous momentum in the States.”
much differently: States that offered leave only to women could not
be seen as working at the vanguard of fighting discriminatory stereotypes, even if some of these states, which offered only pregnancy
disability leave, could be excused from a charge of violating the con363
Other states were just failing to provide generous leave
stitution.
doctrine seems to be to hoard the Constitution-interpreting function in the judicial
branch.
358
Id. at 1985 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia wrote about a state’s immunity
as he would write about an individual’s rights: the violations by other states may justify
abrogation of their sovereign immunity, but any given state deserves to be judged on
its own merits, free from guilt by association. Id. Justice Scalia also equated sovereign
immunity with individual rights in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666, 681-82 (1999). In College Savings Bank, he wrote
that deeming a state’s entry into a regulated business as constructive consent to suit is
analogous to deeming entry into the business of securities transactions as a constructive waiver of the right to a jury trial. Id. at 682.
359
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1985 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
360
Id.
361
Id. at 1989 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
362
Id. at 1989.
363
Id. at 1979-81. Seven states offered leave only to women, and four of these offered only maternity leave. Id. at 1990. One of these states, Louisiana, committed the
offense of offering too much maternity leave (i.e., leave in excess of the six weeks experts attributed to real physical disability). Id. at 1980 n.6. This fact is offered, apparently, not as any evidence of constitutional violation, but merely as evidence that the
states were not in the vanguard of the family leave movement.
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364

entitlements. The majority also saw it as a problem that many states
did not create specific entitlements but relied on “voluntary or discretionary leave programs” that would “do little to combat the stereotypes
about the roles of male and female employees that Congress sought to
365
That is, these states were not in the vanguard with reeliminate.”
spect to using leave entitlements as a tool to wipe out stereotypes. Discretionary leaves might just as well reinforce stereotypes if women are
ones who are granted leaves. The majority thus concluded that
“[a]gainst the above backdrop of limited state leave policies, no matter how generous [Nevada’s] own may have been, Congress was justi366
While Justice
fied in enacting the FMLA as remedial legislation.”
Kennedy was willing to trust the states to solve problems of gender
367
discrimination autonomously within the plans they set up, the majority saw the downside of state autonomy and thought federal legisla368
tion was warranted to bring all the states up to a uniform floor.
The majority feared that without legislation correcting a tendency
to give special regard to new mothers traditional sex roles would be
reinforced and that this seeming benefit for women would actually
369
harm them as they sought equal regard in the workplace. This is an
interesting hypothesis that draws attention to a possible social problem, but it is scarcely a widespread pattern of constitutional rights vio370
The majority was willing to allow general anxieties about
lations.
laggard states to work a transfer of power to Congress quite distinct
from the way it had handled Kimel and Garrett. The dissenting Justices, pushing for taking these precedents seriously, thought the role
371
The Justices, it would
of autonomous states was worth preserving.
seem, split over the perception of the states as vanguard or laggard.
The Justices also differed in their degree of confidence about
where the right answers lay. If one is confidently committed to strictly
equivalent treatment of men and women, one feels motivated to see
Congress as having the power to impose a uniform floor: perception
of federal legislation as a “floor” occurs only in the mind of a person
364

See id. at 1980-81 (noting that “twelve states provided their employees no family
leave, beyond an initial childbirth or adoption, to care for a seriously ill child or family
member”).
365
Id. at 1981.
366
Id. (citation omitted).
367
Id. at 1990 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
368
Id. at 1982-83.
369
Id. at 1982.
370
Id.
371
Id. at 1991.
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who knows which way is up. Yet many reasonable persons have ques372
tioned pure equality as the best way to remedy sex discrimination.
For those with doubts like this, leaving the states alone to experiment
with various policies will be seen in a much more positive light. They
might, like Justice Brandeis, view their overconfident colleagues as
373
Those “overcon“erect[ing their] prejudices into legal principles.”
fident colleagues” in turn are seeing the states as infusing their policies with prejudices of their own—specifically, traditional stereotypes
of the sexes. Perhaps it would be better for the sake of federalism to
free the states to design their own benefit programs, with the constitutional kinks worked out in individual lawsuits relying on Title VII. In
Hibbs itself, Nevada had its own plan, which was displaced by the
FMLA disrespecting what Justice Kennedy called the “States’ autono374
mous power to design their own social benefits regime.” Autonomy
can be valued as capable of producing some good, not just in giving
Congress some ideas in the preuniformity period, but continually—or
at least until a pattern of below-board rights violations emerges to justify a statute regulating a broader swath of behavior.
Of course, as long as Congress could still enact the law under the
commerce power, this autonomy picture seems a bit incoherent. The
states are still required to give twelve weeks of leave, so they in fact
cannot go off and design their own policies. Pulling the Fourteenth
Amendment foundation out from under the FMLA only means that
372

See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, The Constitution of Women, 48 ALA. L. REV. 861, 884
(1997) (surveying forms of feminism other than the Supreme Court’s equality theory
and recommending the exploration of “more complex, contingent accounts of gender
discrimination”); Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 2 (1985) (challenging the Supreme Court’s “assimilationist
model of equality”). Of course, Grutter v. Bollinger showed the majority of the Court in
a state of doubt about whether pure equality is the best way to think about race discrimination. The only justice who embraced pure equality in both Hibbs and Grutter
was Chief Justice Rehnquist. No Justice objected to the pure equality approach in both
cases. Every other Justice leaned once toward the strong equality position and once
toward the weak one. One might speculate that a tendency to defer to Congress motivated members of the Grutter majority to exaggerate the constitutional violations that
supposedly underlay the FMLA in Hibbs. One could also explain the switch on the part
of the Grutter dissenters on the ground that race discrimination is given a higher degree of scrutiny than sex discrimination or on the ground that Hibbs involved a complete failure to satisfy the City of Boerne doctrine. But I think the most sensible explanation for the shifting positions is the differing assessments about which policies were
enlightened and which were backward, and whether such assessments were reliable.
373
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also supra text accompanying notes 25-30 (discussing Justice Brandeis’s views
on federalism).
374
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1992 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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states cannot be subjected to suits by individuals for retrospective relief if they violate the law. What kind of space for experimentation is
375
that?
To embrace the doctrinal structure Justice Kennedy presents, one
would need to find the following set of beliefs appealing: autonomous program designing is a good thing, but the states will not be
permitted to engage in it; nevertheless, if they fail to follow the federal
rules as required, they at least deserve a break in the accumulatedliability department. One could attempt to justify this version on the
doctrine in normative terms on the ground that it spares the state that
misjudges or fails to anticipate how a court will apply the law. This solicitude for the state is appealing if we think the state may be conducting a worthy experiment. By creating an environment in which the
prospect of accumulated liability does not loom ahead, Justice Kennedy’s version of the sovereign immunity doctrine would free some
376
In the Hibbs case, for
states to follow policies that are in fact legal.
example, the state of Nevada was not flouting federal law. Mr. Hibbs
was given leave to tend to his wife’s health problems. He was fired
only after he had used up all of the required leave, according to the
state. Sovereign immunity offers states the power to end a lawsuit
quickly without regard to the substantive merits, and, as was true in
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The limited effect appropriately leads many commentators to question the
Court’s choice to express federalism values through sovereign immunity. See, e.g.,
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 493-94 (2002) (“Sovereign immunity does not restrict the
regulatory power of Congress, it seldom bars suits for injunctions to force compliance
with federal law, and it does not protect local governments at all. Why, then, has the
Court made sovereign immunity a centerpiece of its drive to revive constitutional federalism?”); Pamela S. Karlan, The Irony of Immunity: The Eleventh Amendment, Irreparable
Injury, and Section 1983, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1311, 1330 (2001) (noting the “growing tension between the commitment to state sovereignty that underlies the immunity decisions
and the long-standing doctrines of Ex parte Young and § 1983, which have consistently
worked to circumvent the formal constraints of the Eleventh Amendment”); Daniel J.
Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1011, 1052 (2000) (finding sovereign immunity doctrine “ineffectual and counterproductive”); Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism,
1999 S. CT. REV. 1, 1 (criticizing the Court’s excessive reliance on “the arcane doctrine
of state sovereign immunity”); Charles Fried, Supreme Court Folly, N.Y. TIMES, July 6,
1999, at A17 (criticizing the Court’s over-reliance on sovereign immunity).
Cf. Robert F. Nagel, Real Revolution, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 1003-04 (1997) (noting
that antifederalist scholars’ objectives are “modest and equivocal”).
376
For example, single-sex schools. See supra text accompanying notes 104-08 (discussing the effort made by the majority in the VMI case to preserve room for positive
experiments with single-sex education).
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Hibbs, the state may deserve to win on the merits as well. Yet if a case
is decided on the sovereign immunity defense, we are deprived of the
ability to learn through the lawsuit whether or not the state was flouting the federal law that it was obligated to follow.
CONCLUSION
This Article has examined the way ideas about laggard states and
vanguard states have affected the Court’s federalism doctrine in recent years, in particular, the scope of Congress’s power under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Many of us who think about federalism worry about laggard states—the literacy-test-wielding rearguard
springs all too easily to mind, blotting out thoughts of more positive
experiments. For the “laggard sensitive,” expansive constitutional
rights will seem to be important tools, not obstacles to progress like
the substantive due process rights that troubled Justice Brandeis in
New State Ice. Strong congressional power to control the laggard states
will also seem quite appealing, and Hibbs will be seen as a welcome
break from the rigors of Kimel and Garrett. Some of us who think
about federalism, however, genuinely share Justice Brandeis’s optimism about states as laboratories of democracy. This cast of mind is
skeptical about over-expanding rights and favors a role for the courts
378
in holding off the political excesses of Congress in order to preserve
a place for state experimentation.
Quite aside from this optimism or pessimism about the role the
states can play, many of us, at least much of the time, will feel quite
377

Surely, one must wonder whether this watered-down federalism is worth the
confusion and unclarity it creates. The tendency toward moderation is apparent and is
understandable, but it may be worse than either the extreme of undertaking a genuinely vigorous enforcement of federalism or the extreme of leaving federalism enforcement to Congress, as the Seminole Tribe dissenters advocated. For a look at what
genuinely vigorous enforcement of federalism would be like, one could patch together
a number of Justice Thomas’s dissenting and concurring opinions. See, e.g., Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U. S. 564, 609 (1997) (Thomas,
J., dissenting); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). For a pre-Lopez meditation on the subject, see Ann Althouse, Federalism, Untamed, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1207 (1994). An interesting recent effort exploring a somewhat vigorous enforcement of federalism is Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young,
Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75 (2001). The approach they explore can only be called somewhat vigorous, because it includes overruling Seminole Tribe.
378
See Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1200 (2001) (expressing the concern that “specialinterest politics, not factfinding in the public interest, dominate[s] congressional decisionmaking”).
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dubious about whether any position on a given policy matter deserves
to be called vanguard or laggard. Even if one believes there really are
vanguard and laggard policies, it may not matter unless one also believes that someone—the states, the courts, or Congress—is going to
379
do a better job than someone else classifying the various policies.
Yet, if one thinks there is a vanguard direction and that it is good to
take it, but also thinks that no one in power will reliably find it, one
ought to want decisions to be made at the lowest level—without “risk
380
to the rest of the country,” as Justice Brandeis put it. In this view,
the uniform federal statute becomes worrisome and edges the decision maker toward imposing restraints on congressional power. If one
believes there are vanguard states and laggard states, the key question
becomes whether to trust Congress to choose the vanguard policy and
impose it on the entire country—to take the risk Justice Brandeis
wanted to avoid. If one thinks the states through experimentation are
most likely to find the vanguard, or that at least one brave state may
find the vanguard, there remains a question whether Congress ought
to have an eventual role in choosing which policies to transform into
381
uniform rules.
The current Supreme Court falls into three groups when it comes
to these matters. The first group, consisting of Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, is committed to the idea of judicial identification of rights, taking certain favored matters out of legislative hands,
and then allowing what remains to be governed by federal law to the
extent Congress sees fit. This is the political model of federalism that
382
What
has long been endorsed by the liberal side of the Court.
379

See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994) (discussing comparative institutional analysis).
380
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
381
Cf. Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory
of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 271
(1990) (noting the relative ease of “obtain[ing] passage of one federal statute” compared with “passage of fifty state statutes”).
382
This position is also endorsed by many commentators. See, e.g., JESSE H.
CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 192-93 (1980) (advocating
reliance on political branches to protect federalism values); Larry D. Kramer, Putting
the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 293
(2000) (finding the political safeguards model of federalism still valid); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954) (proposing “political
safeguards” model).
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background beliefs about vanguard states and laggard states influence
a decision maker to adopt this attitude? There is in fact a wide range
of beliefs that can give rise to and reinforce this approach to the federalism problem, including the following: fear of the laggard state,
doubt about the existence of vanguard states, belief in the ability of
Congress to mediate between the two types of states, belief that it is
good to have a uniform law imposing the best policy (perhaps the policy Congress will learn is best from observing the vanguard states), belief that uniformity is generally good, belief that Congress will be in
the best position to determine when uniformity is good, or simple
skepticism about what is good and whether there are any vanguards
383
and laggards at all.
The second group consists of Justices Scalia and Thomas, who
take very nearly the opposite position. They generally favor narrow
construction of constitutional rights and robust enforcement of federalism doctrine, to hold off Congress and preserve room for state and
384
local governments to go about setting their own policies. These Justices are far more willing than other members of the Court to approve
of free and decentralized local democracy. In particular, they are
much less affected by perceptions that the states are in the vanguard
or lagging behind on what other Justices may visualize as a road of
progress. The traditional state, in their view, deserves its autonomy as
much as the innovator that Justice Brandeis’s “laboratories of democracy” model idealized.

383

This last idea, simple skepticism, can very well lead to extreme deference to
Congress. If one sees only various political actors fighting to have their way, it might
make sense for the Court to let the strongest legislature—Congress—prevail. This was
the form that judicial restraint took for Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who viewed
legislation as nothing but a process of “shift[ing] disagreeable burdens from the
shoulders of the stronger to those of the weaker.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, Ideals and
Doubts, 10 ILL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1915), reprinted in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE
HOLMES: COMPLETE PUBLIC WRITINGS AND SELECTED JUDICIAL OPINIONS OF OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES 442, 443 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995), reprinted in ALBERT W.
ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES
58 (2000). In Professor Alschuler’s words, “[a]lthough Holmes viewed the legislature
as an unprincipled battlefield, he believed that judges should not deprive the victors of
their spoils.” ALSCHULER, supra, at 58.
384
For a scholarly discussion rejecting the political safeguards model of federalism,
see Baker & Young, supra note 377. See also Marci A. Hamilton, Why Federalism Must Be
Enforced: A Response to Professor Kramer, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1069 (2001) (arguing that the
safeguards theory is based on false historical and empirical assumptions); Saikrishna B.
Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories,
79 TEX. L. REV. 1459 (2001) (arguing against political safeguards theory on textual,
originalist, and structural grounds).
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The third group is the powerful, yet beleaguered, center: Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and Kennedy. They determine
outcomes as they decide which of the other of the two groups to join
on any particular occasion. This group has some concern about overstating the scope of constitutional rights and some interest in restraining Congress to preserve autonomy for state and local governments.
They are sensitive to the context of particular cases and consequently,
more susceptible to the influence of ideas about the positive and
386
While thoughts
negative contributions of the states and Congress.
about where the vanguard is and who the laggards are can influence
choices, these thoughts can and should cause dissonance for judges,
who must worry about intruding on the choices of democratic institutions, even as they feel they are doing what is necessary to facilitate the
functioning of democracy. The middle is a precarious position to attempt to occupy. It yields complicated doctrine and a wavering line of
387
cases that make easy targets for the Court’s critics and undermine
confidence in the Court as a principled instrument of the rule of law.
While I see these problems with the middle position, I must confess to finding moderation attractive enough to keep me from preferring either of the other two positions. All three positions have
strengths and weaknesses, and all three strike me as worthy attempts
385

See, e.g., Banks, supra note 22, at 470 (“Understanding the limits of Congress’s
Section 5 power is notoriously difficult because the doctrinal position a Justice stakes
out is fact-sensitive and always affected by a variety of legal and political factors.”); Fallon, supra note 375, at 492 (“[I]f the Rehnquist Court’s federalism revival has not rendered federal courts law dramatically less coherent, neither has it arrested the slide
into Byzantine complexity.”); Karlan, supra note 375, at 1330 (noting that “[e]xplicit
right-remedy gaps seldom produce particularly stable doctrine” and seeing potential
for the Court in the future to deal with “the paradox its sovereign immunity decisions
have spawned” by limiting prospective as well as retrospective relief); Daniel J. Meltzer,
Overcoming Immunity: The Case of Federal Regulation of Intellectual Property, 53 STAN. L.
REV. 1331, 1391 (2001) (expressing doubt that “the present doctrinal pattern creates a
stable resting place”). But see Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the Court’s Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477, 497-500 (2001) (finding stability in
the Court’s recent federalism precedents, despite their narrow majorities because they
arose in a “social and political context” favoring decentralization).
386
For a helpful analysis comparing this style of decision making to the more rulebased approach, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 22, 122-23 (1992). Also helpful is Justice Scalia’s incisive defense of rule-based
decision making over the case-by-case, multi-factored approach. Antonin Scalia, The
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
387
See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Eleventh Amendment Schizophrenia, 75 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 859, 912-15 (2000) (critiquing the Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence);
Louise Weinberg, Of Sovereignty and Union: The Legends of Alden, 76 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1113 (2001) (arguing that the state sovereign immunity doctrine embodied in
Alden v. Maine is based on faulty premises).
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to solve the difficult federalism problem. I am inclined to think that
the Stevens-Souter-Breyer-Ginsburg position is likely to prevail in the
long run because it provides a clear and stable resolution. The ScaliaThomas position is also attractively clear and stable, but it is unlikely
to prevail: the center’s cold feet seem to be a permanent affliction.
Hibbs showed two members of the center group, the Chief Justice and
Justice O’Connor, to be unable to follow through on the doctrine the
center had carved out in City of Boerne, Florida Prepaid, Morrison, Kimel,
and Garrett. Justice Kennedy was left with the task of defending the
center position alone, cheered perhaps by the company of Justices
Scalia and Thomas, whose commitment to vigorous federalism enforcement has spared them many struggles. I would like to be able to
say that I find the middle position the best, but the difficulty the Court
has had in defining it and making it comprehensible and convincing
to fair-minded readers makes it quite hard to support. If the federalism-enforcing project is to succeed, the Court must move beyond be388
wildering complexities and articulate a coherent, normative vision.
In this light, the extensive reliance on the arcana of sovereign immunity doctrine has been uninspiring.
My chief purpose in writing this Article has been to try to understand the process of reaching decisions about federalism and to shed
some light on the various positions. One can never know exactly what
goes into another person’s opinions; it is not even easy to detect the
true cause of one’s own opinions, so looking behind what judges
choose to reveal in their writings is a tenuous endeavor. Yet I would
maintain that it is an even more tenuous endeavor to attempt to understand, or to influence, the Court’s federalism jurisprudence without thinking about such things.
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As Professors Post and Siegel have written, “[a]lthough the Court may claim
authority to speak for the Constitution, that authority does not exist merely by decree.
It must be earned by articulating a vision of the Constitution that the nation is prepared to accept.” Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the
People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 43 (2003). For a criticism of the Court for “fail[ing] to articulate an overarching vision” of federalism and
an argument recommending more attention to the “vertical competition between the
states and the federal government for the people’s ‘affection,’” see Todd E. Pettys,
Competing for the People’s Affection: Federalism’s Forgotten Marketplace, 56 VAND. L. REV.
329, 330, 332 (2003).

